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Responding to the proliferation of international criminal tribunals
during the last two decades, scholars have engaged in a rich debate about
the normative foundations of international criminal law (“ICL”). The
retributive theory of punishment—which justifies punishment based on
the culpability of the accused, rather than by reference to its social
benefits—has met with significant skepticism in these discussions. Some
have argued that unique features of international criminal justice—for
example, the extreme selectivity of punishment or the lack of certain social
or political preconditions—are a poor match for retributive theory.
Others have ignored retributivism altogether, or afforded the theory only
passing mention.
This Article counters the anti-retributive strain by arguing that
retributivism can indeed provide a meaningful framework for
understanding ICL. First, I argue that in most respects retributive theory
is no less plausible in the international setting than it is in the domestic
setting. Understanding what claims retributive thinking might have
upon ICL requires one to distinguish claims regarding the general
justification required to defend punishment as a social practice—the core
concern of retributive theory—from the more specific questions of
institutional design—such as whether and when to create an
international criminal tribunal, and how to set enforcement priorities—
that are most pertinent to ICL scholars. I argue that, once these
distinctions are sorted out, the anti-retributivist strain in ICL scholarship
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does little to engage retributivism’s core claim that desert is necessary to
morally justified punishment and provides an inherently good (if not
exclusive) reason to punish irrespective of potential social benefits.
I also argue that retributivism is more compatible than commonly
supposed with current thinking about international criminal justice. The
theory permits various models for engaging the compromises of real world
institutions. It provides a powerful lens for understanding the design of
ICL institutions such as the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), and it
is also compatible with dominant approaches to institutional decisions
such as case selection and sentencing. Perhaps counter-intuitively,
retributivism can also supply a framework for sometimes favoring
alternatives to the traditional criminal prosecutions pursued by
international courts, or even for opposing ICL altogether.
Finally, I argue that choice of punishment philosophy has less
practical significance for ICL than theorists often assume. In particular, I
argue that the choice between retributivism and other competing theories
does little to resolve important policy dilemmas dividing theorists of ICL,
including whether prosecution should sometimes be abandoned for
amnesty or other alternatives. This point supports a broader argument
that ICL is simultaneously overdetermined and underdetermined by
traditional punishment theory: While the core of ICL is consistent with
multiple theories of punishment, these theories provide only limited
practical guidance on the most divisive questions.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/2

02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/13/2014 11:07 AM

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

971

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................972
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES ...................................978
2.1. Retributive Justice as Harsh Justice ......................................981
2.2. The Utility of Desert ..............................................................985
2.3. Selective Punishment.............................................................987
POLITICAL RETRIBUTIVSM...........................................................990
3.1. The Political Legitimacy of International Tribunals .............991
3.2. The Fair Play Model of Contractarian Justice .......................994
INSTITUTIONAL RETRIBUTIVISM ..................................................998
4.1. Minimalism ...........................................................................998
4.2. A Duty to Punish ................................................................1001
4.2.1. Absolutism.................................................................1002
4.2.2. Agent-Relativism ......................................................1003
4.3. Consequentialist Retributivism ...........................................1007
4.3.1. ICL and Maximizing Retribution .............................1009
4.3.2. The Challenge of Alternative Justice .........................1012
4.3.3. Consequentialist Retributivism and Other Values ...1016
4.4. Threshold Retributivism ......................................................1019
RETRIBUTIVISM AS A GOOD REASON TO PUNISH
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ..........................................................1021
5.1. The Morality of Punishment ...............................................1024
5.2. Retributivism and the Structure of ICL ..............................1028
THE LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT THEORY ......................................1032
6.1. Crimes ..................................................................................1033
6.2. Design and Alternatives to Prosecution..............................1036
6.3. Case Selection ......................................................................1038
6.4. Sentencing ...........................................................................1041
CONCLUSION .............................................................................1043

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE)

10/13/2014 11:07 AM

972

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.
1.

[Vol. 35:4

INTRODUCTION

What is the point of international criminal justice? So asks
Mirjan Damaška in an article whose title aptly summarizes a
significant strain of international legal scholarship over the last two
decades.1 Responding to the unprecedented proliferation of
international criminal tribunals during this time, scholars have
engaged in a rich debate about the normative foundations of
international criminal law (“ICL”). The retributive theory of
punishment—which justifies punishment based on the culpability
of the accused rather than by reference to its social benefits—has
faced significant skepticism in these discussions.2
Although theorists differ in their particular responses to
retributivism, two general strains are apparent. The first is a
tendency to treat retributivism as a theory that is uniquely
problematic in the international setting. Robert Sloane, for
instance, has pointed to fundamental differences between the
domestic and international political orders that, in his view,
diminish retributivism’s ability to guide international criminal
justice: “Retribution . . . emerges as a problematic justification for
ICL punishment,” he argues, “in large part because it presupposes
both a coherent community and a relatively stable sociopolitical or
legal order characterized by shared values. The circumstances that
enable widespread violations of international humanitarian law
and human rights atrocities generally involve the breakdown of
precisely that order.”3 Other scholars have argued that the
selectivity in punishment for mass atrocity prevents ICL from
serving a retributive function. For Mark Drumbl, “[t]he retributive
function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets
punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for political
1
Mirjan R. Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice? 83
CHI-KENT L.REV. 329 (2008).
2
See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection
at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 302 (2012) (“Most
scholars who have considered the question, however, reject retribution as a
justification for ICC adjudication, or at least they express skepticism about the
Court’s ability to serve retributive ends.”); David S. Koller, The Faith of the
International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 1019, 1025-26 (2008)
(“[A]rguments from retribution have made little headway in international
criminal law and were sharply criticized even before the first international
tribunal was established at Nuremberg.”)
3
Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 81 (2007).
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reasons anathema to Kantian deontology.”4 Arguing along similar
lines, Diane Marie Amann observes that “[a]s a result of selectivity
and randomness, just deserts have been meted out inconsistently,
in very few conflicts, and on only a few defendants. These factors
thus have disserved the goal of retribution.”5
These critiques withhold judgment regarding the role of
retributivism with respect to ordinary domestic crimes. Rather,
they focus on features of the international setting that allegedly
render retributivism uniquely inappropriate to ICL.
The
purported failure of retributive considerations to justify and guide
the contemporary practice of ICL supports broader arguments that
ICL must resort to a unique approach to punishment, one that is
distinct from the traditional punishment theories invoked in the
domestic setting.6
The second strain is that retributive theory itself receives
relatively sparse attention. The literature contains many, often
passing statements about retributivism’s failures at the
international level, but these accounts generally do not offer a welldeveloped account of how a system of retributive justice is
supposed to function.
Some accounts ignore retributivism
altogether, and either assume or take for granted that the purpose
of ICL is to achieve beneficial social outcomes.7 Indeed, it is
surprising, given the attention devoted to international criminal
legal theory over the last two decades, that the field is lacking in
systematic applications of retributive theory to the international

4
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 151
(“The retributive function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets
punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for political reasons anathema to
Kantian deontology.”).
5
Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 93, 117 (2002) (footnote omitted).
6
Sloane and Amann favor expressive approaches to international criminal
justice. See generally Sloane, supra note 3; Amann, supra note 5. Drumbl advocates
what he terms a “cosmopolitan pluralist” approach that emphasizes domestic
alternatives to conventional criminal trials. DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 195.
7
See, e.g., Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The
Disutility of Desert, 52 V.J. INT’L. L. 633 (2011) (discussing the widespread disregard
for retributivism on the international law level); Damaška, supra note 1 (“[A]
rigorous system for the rule of law cannot at present be established.”). I have also
made this assumption in a previous work. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice
Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 601-04 (2007) (focusing on crime prevention as the
rationale for establishing the International Criminal Court).
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setting.8 This is true even of scholars who have endorsed
retributivism to a greater or lesser degree. Scholars in this group
either limit their analysis to a particular setting—such as
sentencing9—or they merely identify retributive considerations—
without further analysis—as one of several rationales for
international criminal justice.10
This omission is unfortunate, because the question of how
retributivism might guide a system of criminal justice is more
complex than might be supposed, and receives no uniform answer
even among criminal law theorists focused primarily on domestic
institutions. A retributivist justifies punishment by reference to the
culpability of the accused. That much is straightforward. But,
even without considering the special features of the international
setting, this basic formulation leaves much unanswered, both
about the basic concept of retributivism, and about the theory’s
8
A notable exception is Adil Haque’s elaboration of a relational theory,
which outlines a political theory of retributivist international criminal justice. See
Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist
Theory of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 272 (2005).
9
See, e.g., Jens Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International Sentencing, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW (Goran
Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009); Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a
Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415
(2001); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in
International Criminal Trials, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 757, 757–58 (2007). International
criminal tribunals have also emphasized that retribution is an important goal of
sentencing. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21/A, Judgment, ¶ 806
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (stating that “that two
of the main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and
retribution”). See also Koller, supra note 2, at 1026–27 (“Arguments from the
retributive need for punishment may continue to be adduced in certain specific
areas, such as in justifying sentences (here again, partly as a result of the lack of a
sufficient theory).”).
10
See, e.g., David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality and the
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
576 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010) (noting in passing that
“[s]tandard justifications (retribution, general and special deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation) all raise familiar and difficult justificatory problems,
which are no less acute in ICL than they are in domestic legal systems,” before
arguing that “the most promising justification for international tribunals is their
role in norm projection.”) (emphasis in original); GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 30 (2005) (noting in passing that “[a]lso, the idea of
retribution undeniably has its place.”); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can
International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 10 (2001)
(maintaining that “[b]eyond retribution and the moral impulse to vindicate
humanitarian norms, individual accountability for massive crimes is an essential
part of a preventive strategy and, thus, a realistic foundation for a lasting peace.”).
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implications for the design and operation of real world justice
institutions. Indeed, a common critique of retributive theory is that
it is an incomplete theory of punishment, one that fails to supply
legislators, investigators, prosecutors, and judges with
comprehensive guidance as they pursue justice in a world of
imperfect knowledge and scarce resources.11
Retributivism’s response to this challenge has decisive
significance for the role that the theory can play in ICL. If it is the
case that retributivism simply does not speak to real world
enforcement challenges, then of course, retributivism will not
inform many of the problems of deepest interest to international
criminal lawyers. Making this point requires no special insights
about ICL. The failure is merely a reflection of a general limitation
in the theory, one equally applicable in the domestic context. If, on
the other hand, retributivism can accommodate the real world
constraints and competing values that inevitably accompany the
realization of criminal justice, then it is worth considering whether
and how these accommodations translate to the international
setting.
Targeting a gap in the literature, this Article undertakes a
closer consideration of retributivism’s relevance to ICL. I do not
here advance a comprehensive defense of retributivism as the
exclusive or optimal theory of either criminal law in general or ICL
in particular. Indeed, my primary agenda is not to defend an
international criminal retributivism against skeptics, but to
undertake the necessary preliminary step of exploring what it
means to be a retributivist about ICL in the first instance.
Nevertheless, I also believe there is more to be said about
retributivism’s contribution to ICL than the literature has thus far
explored, and that retributivism plays a greater justifying role than
is sometimes supposed. To that end, I advance several claims.
First, I argue that in most respects retributive theory is no less
plausible in the international setting than it is in the domestic
setting. Understanding what claims retributive thinking might
11
See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 308-11
(2002) (detailing the limitations of the retributive theory); Michael T. Cahill,
Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 815, 818 (2007)
(“[R]etributivism, which adopts a backward-looking perspective focusing on the
moral duty to punish past wrongdoing, is a justificatory theory, but seemingly not
a prescriptive one. It offers retribution as a justifying ideal but does not explain
how legal institutions are supposed to make retribution real.”).
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have upon ICL demands that one distinguish claims regarding the
general justification required to defend punishment as a social
practice—the core concern of retributive theory—from the more
specific questions of institutional design—such as whether and
when to create an international criminal tribunal, and how to set
enforcement priorities—that are most pertinent to ICL scholars. I
argue that, once these distinctions are sorted out, the antiretributivist strain in ICL scholarship does little to engage
retributivism’s core claim that desert is necessary to morally
justified punishment and provides an inherently good (if not
exclusive) reason to punish irrespective of potential social benefits.
Both claims, for instance, are compatible with the conditions of
social instability and selective punishment that typify ICL
prosecutions.
I also argue that retributivism is more compatible than
commonly supposed with current thinking about international
criminal justice.
Retributivism provides a useful lens for
understanding the design of ICL institutions such as the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), and it is compatible with
prevailing views on institutional decisions such as case selection
and sentencing. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the theory can also
supply a framework for favoring alternatives to the traditional
criminal prosecutions pursued by international courts, or even for
opposing ICL altogether.
These observations are subject, moreover, to the qualification
that one must adhere to a version of the theory that is sufficiently
adaptable to accommodate real world constraints. The plausibility
of a retributivist ICL, in other words, depends on the adoption of a
retributivism that is itself plausible, one that looks to the desert of
the accused as a limitation on justified punishment and as an
intrinsic reason to punish, while also acknowledging both the
compromises inherent in implementing a system of criminal justice
and the sometimes overriding claims of other, non-retributive
values.
Finally, I argue that choice of punishment philosophy has less
practical significance for ICL than might be assumed. In particular
I argue that the choice between retributivism and other competing
theories does little to resolve important policy dilemmas dividing
theorists of ICL, including whether prosecution should sometimes
be abandoned for amnesty or other alternatives. This point
supports a broader argument that ICL is simultaneously
overdetermined and underdetermined by traditional punishment
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theories: While the core of ICL is consistent with multiple
justifications for punishment, these approaches provide only
limited practical guidance on the most divisive questions.
My argument proceeds in five parts. Part 2 focuses on the
distinction between retributive and non-retributive approaches to
punishment. Relying on a basic, but incomplete, account of
retributivism, it reveals how approaches to ICL commonly
associated with retributivism are in fact either utilitarian in nature
or fail to engage the core claims of retributive justifications. This
Part focuses in particular distinguishing retributivism from
approaches that emphasize the social benefits of desert-based
punishment and on critiques of selectivity in ICL.
Part 3 focuses briefly on the political theory of ICL, and
explores ways to defend an international retributivism against
contractarian arguments that highlight the significant differences
between the political background of domestic and international
justice respectively.
Part 4 focuses on a problem that has occupied the work of some
criminal law theorists but has thus far failed to attract significant
attention among international scholars: The challenge involved in
translating retributive principles into a blueprint for real-world
justice institutions. This Part first explores the tensions between a
minimalist version of retributivism which does little practical
work, and the problems presented by a deontological
understanding of criminal justice which appears either to impose
an impossible, absolute duty to punish, or, by virtue of limitations
on the duty’s reach, fails to constrain many of the most important
questions surrounding the establishment and enforcement of ICL.
This Part then examines the implications for ICL of two
approaches, both figuring in the work of Michael Moore, that offer
some accommodation between retributive goals, on the one hand,
and the competing values and constraints that accompany the
work of criminal justice institutions.
The first of these,
consequentialist retributivism, treats retributive justice as a good to
be maximized and balanced against other equivalent goods. The
second, threshold deontology, provides an exception to retributive
obligations when overwhelming non-retributive considerations so
demand. These more flexible understandings of retributivism offer
greater plausibility as justifications for ICL, but this plausibility
comes at the price of significant indeterminacy, revealing that
retributive arguments are available both to proponents of
international prosecutorial efforts and to advocates of alternative,
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quasi-punitive or non-punitive approaches.
Because both
understandings also acknowledge non-retributive values, they
undermine Moore’s suggestion that retributivism is a complete
theory of punishment that operates to the exclusion of nonretributive justifications.
Part 5 identifies and qualifiedly defends a function of
retributivism that I label “good reason retributivism.” As the
competing retributive theories all reveal, the most that
retributivism can provide is a powerful, but non-exclusive, reason
to punish. According to this value pluralist understanding, the
wrongdoing of the offender provides a prima facie argument in
favor of punishment. This understanding also acknowledges,
however, that desert does not provide an exclusive reason to
punish, and that both policy makers and participants in the justice
system may balance retributive values against non-retributive
values. While this approach shares the indeterminacy of all
attempts to accommodate retributivism to real world constraints, I
indicate several reasons why good reason retributivism has
normative force for ICL and provides a useful descriptive
framework for understanding the existing ICL regime.
Part 6, finally, strikes a note of caution regarding the
significance of punishment theory for the questions most debated
by ICL scholars. Focusing on four specific contexts—the reach of
substantive ICL, the debate over amnesty, case selection, and
sentencing—it argues that consensus positions are defensible
through multiple approaches to punishment while other questions
will remain divisive irrespective of whether there is general
agreement regarding the appropriate punishment philosophy.
2.

RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

Retributivism is the approach to criminal law that justifies
punishment based on the desert of the offender. It is in this way
distinct from utilitarian justifications that emphasize the positive
social consequences of punishment, such as crime prevention. This
brief summary provides a basic, uncontested account of
retributivism, one that is familiar to theorists of criminal law,12 and
12
See Mitchell Berman, Two Types of Retributivism, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011) (“Over the
ensuing years . . . a consensus has arisen. As CL Ten put it in a much read book,
‘Contemporary retributivists treat the notion of desert as central to the
retributivist theory, punishment being justified in terms of the desert of the
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also to ICL scholarship.13 As I shall elaborate, this statement is also
incomplete in important ways. For instance, it does not explain
how a retributivist should resolve the tradeoffs that inevitably
accompany the real world implementation of criminal justice. It
does not identify the weight to be given retributivism in the face of
other competing interests. Nor does it explain how much of the
criminal justice system should be guided by retributive thinking.
For example, if retributivism provides a guiding philosophy for
judges, can it do likewise for prosecutors, as well as for legislators
and police officers?14 Applying retributivism to such questions
requires one to choose a distinct version of retributivism, or to
supplement retributive thinking with consideration of other
values.
Nevertheless, even this basic, incomplete account of
retributivism is instructive for appraising the role of punishment
theory in ICL. For one, this basic account provides a means of
distinguishing retributive from non-retributive theories. The bestknown competitors to retributivism are utilitarian approaches
focused on crime prevention through deterrence, incapacitation,
denunciation, and rehabilitation.15 One may also add to this list of
utilitarian rationales expressive approaches to criminal law, which
have featured prominently in ICL scholarship, although the
classification of these approaches depends in part on what work
the expressive capacity of criminal law is meant to do.16
offender.’”) (quoting CL TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 46 (1987)). Berman
notes that retributivists’ accounts differ as to whether it is criminal punishment
itself, or merely suffering, that is merited by desert. The distinction is important
because, in the latter scenario, further explanation is required for why the state
should establish institutions to mete out deserved suffering. Id.
13
See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 2, at 301 (“Although retributive theories
take a variety of forms, all retributivists share the belief that desert justifies the
infliction of punishment and mandates its quantity.”).
14 See infra Part 4.
15
See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 60-61 (Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore & Stephen J.
Morse eds., 1999) (discussing the theories of ”incapacitation, special deterrence,
general deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation, and retribution”).
16
Expressive rationales that highlight the ability of criminal punishment to
prevent crime, or realize other extrinsic social benefits are utilitarian in nature.
For examples, see Luban, supra note 10; Amann, supra note 5; and Sloane, supra
note 3. If an expressive goal of punishment is to cultivate societal support for
desert-based punishment itself, then that type of expressive rationale may be
integrated into the variant of retributivism known as consequentialist
retributivism. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. To the extent that
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Of these, the deterrence rationale has featured especially
prominently in the sentencing jurisprudence of international
tribunals,17 although it has garnered substantial skepticism among
scholars.18 But advocates of international criminal tribunals have
put forward other, more complex and ambitious preventative
goals. A commonly stated aspiration is that the prosecution of
high level-offenders can have transformative social effects in
affected societies. By revealing the truth about atrocities, satisfying
victim demands for justice, and emphasizing individual over
collective responsibility, the hope is that tribunals will help break
cycles of violence, delegitimize criminal regimes, and promote
transitions to peaceful liberal societies rooted in the rule of law.19
Advocates of ICL have also emphasized the expressive potential of
trials. As David Luban puts it, “the most promising justification
for international criminal tribunals is their role in norm projection:
expression merely forms part of the definition of punishment—in the sense that
criminal punishment by definition expresses condemnation for wrongdoing
whereas other harsh measures do not—then the expressive function belongs to all
approaches to punishment, including retribution. See LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT
AND RETRIBUTION 45 (2006) (noting that authors of expressive or communicational
theories of punishment “frequently . . . equivocate as to whether the moral
censure or condemnation is part of the definition of punishment or part of what
justifies it”).
17 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 9, ¶ 806 (stating that “two of the
main purposes of sentencing for these crimes are deterrence and retribution.”).
Some ICTY sentencing judgments have been less accepting of retributive
rationales. See Ohlin, supra note 9, at 384 n.56 (surveying ICTY sentencing
judgments).
18 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 605-07 (discussing problems of interState cooperation and state sovereignty which confound the goals of deterrence);
Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006) (questioning the value of
applying deterrence theory in atrocity prevention); Sloane, supra note 3, at 74
(maintaining that some criminals weigh the costs and benefits in self-interested
and idiosyncratic ways frustrating the goals of deterrence); David Wippman,
Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473
(1999) (denouncing deterrence as “at best plausible but [a] largely untested
assumption”).
19
See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2031-32 (1998) (distilling the “goals most frequently
articulated by the diplomats who established these tribunals and the relevant
epistemic community of international lawyers,” including these goals: to
”channel victims’ thirst for revenge toward peaceful dispute resolution, tell the
truth about what occurred, thereby preserving an accurate historical account of
barbarism that would help prevent its recurrence, [and] perhaps most
importantly, restore the lost civility of torn societies to achieve national
reconciliation”).
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trials are expressive acts broadcasting the news that mass atrocities
are, in fact, heinous crimes and not merely politics by other
means.”20
The distinction between retributive and non-retributive
rationales is sometimes a source of confusion, and the
categorization of justifications has been a distinct focus of criminal
law scholarship, with several important essays dating from the
1970s and 1980s when criminal theory experienced its welldocumented retributivist revival.21 Michael Moore has provided
perhaps the most exhaustive catalog, identifying seven different
views that “are often paraded as retributivist, but in fact are not.”22
As I outline below, several of these rationales surface in debates
about ICL.
2.1. Retributive Justice as Harsh Justice
Moore first rebuts the misconception that retributivism is
“identified with a particular measure of punishment such as lex
talionis, an eye for an eye, or with a kind of punishment such as the
Whereas retributivists are “commonly
death penalty.”23
committed to the principle that punishment must be graded in
proportion to desert . . . they are not committed to any particular
penalty scheme nor any particular penalty as being deserved.”24
This distinction is important for contemporary debates about
ICL sentencing practices, which have focused on the perceived

20
Luban, supra note 10, at 576. See also Amman, supra note 5, at 118
(explaining that “[l]aw reflects a society’s values, what it esteems, what it abhors.”
(footnote omitted)); deGuzman, supra note 2, at 270 (arguing that the Court’s case
selection should aim primarily to maximize the Court’s expressive impact);
Sloane, supra note 3, at 83 (“Emphasizing the expressive function of punishment
in the context of ICL would enable tribunals to begin to address proportionality in
a non-arbitrary way.”).
21
See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of Just
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845-46 (2002) (collecting respective references to
retributivism’s “revival,” “resurgence,” “renaissance,” and “rise” during this
period).
22
MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 88
(1997) (“Retributivism differs from a variety of views that are often paraded as
retributivist, but that in fact are not.”).
23
Id. Lex talionis does figure in Kant’s account of punishment. IMMANUEL
KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
231-32 (John Ladd ed., 2d ed. 1999) (1797).
24 Id.
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leniency of international sentencing.25 For Mark Drumbl, this
leniency “weakens retribution’s credibility as a penological goal for
international criminal law.”26 Embracing a similar assumption,
Jens Ohlin advances a retributivist approach to international
sentencing which distinguishes between two variants of sentencing
proportionality, an ordinal proportionality or “defendant-relative”
concept that assigns higher sentences to more culpable defendants
and lower sentences to less culpable defendants, and a cardinal
proportionality or “offence gravity” concept that requires the
punishment to “match the gravity of the offense.”27 Ohlin notes
that an over-emphasis on defendant-relative gravity by
international
tribunals
will
undermine
offense-gravity
proportionality by imposing lenient sentences on serious offenders
of mass atrocities who happen to have committed marginally less
grave offenses than other, even more culpable offenders.28
25
See DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 156 (“If retribution truly were to reflect the
gravity of extraordinary international criminality, death might even fall short”);
Ohlin, supra note 9, at 373 (“When compared against sentences handed down in
the United States for regular crimes, the sentences of international criminal
tribunals are typically far lower, even though the crimes at these tribunals are far
greater in both moral depravity and legal significance.”); Kevin Jon Heller, A
Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 118-22
(summarizing the comparative leniency of ICTY and ICTR sentences for
international offenses involving murder, torture, and rape to average sentences in
many countries for murder, torture, and rape).
26 See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 156 (“In sum: for those who commit the
most egregious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,
sanctions tend to range from less severe to as severe as the punishments for
ordinary murder in many countries. But extraordinary international crimes are
supposedly graver than serious ordinary common crimes. The fact that
punishment does not match this enhanced gravity weakens retribution credibility
as a penological goal for international crimes.”).
27 Ohlin, supra note 9, at 398. On ordinal versus cardinal proportionality, see
generally, Andrew Von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 16
CRIME AND JUSTICE 55, 75-79 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
28
Ohlin, supra note 9, at 399 (arguing that, for serious international crimes,
“defendant-relative proportionality and offence-gravity proportionality are
actually at cross purposes, in that fidelity to defendant-relative proportionality
may lead a court to lower the sentence of a defendant to such a degree that it
violates the intuitive directives of offence-gravity proportionality.”). See also
Koller, supra note 2, at 1026 (“[A]rguments from retribution face further hurdles in
the context of international criminal law. As a practical matter, penal sanctions of
any form are comparatively trivial as retribution for the crimes addressed by
international criminal law, such as genocide or other instances of mass atrocity. If
a domestic court sends the murderer of one person to prison for life or even
executes him, what punishment is appropriate for the mass murderer of
thousands?”).
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There is much in Ohlin’s approach that I agree with, although
his appeal to offense gravity proportionality begs the question of
how one determines, in some objective sense, which punishment
matches any particular offense. Perhaps Ohlin’s distinction has
more practical impact if one recharacterizes it in terms of two types
of ordinal proportionality: a narrower concept that compares
defendants only to other defendants appearing before the same
international criminal tribunal (or maybe to other international
criminal defendants as a class), and a broader concept that
compares ICL defendants to the broader class of ordinary criminal
defendants.29 If, for example, domestic mass murderers are
generally accorded life sentences, then under the broader
proportionality framework, it makes no sense, absent other
intervening considerations, to give an equally or more culpable
international defendant less than life merely because that
international defendant has an even guiltier co-defendant.
If it is indeed the case that a narrow concept of defendantrelative proportionality has led international tribunals to impose
sentences that are excessively low in comparison to what a broader
proportionality metric would require, then a broader
proportionality concept that looks to domestic practices can inform
a retributivist critique of international sentencing practice.30
Although this critique will happen to argue in favor of higher
29
This broader proportionality concept is at the heart of Drumbl’s critique,
which notes that sanctions for international offenses “tend to range from less
severe to as severe as the punishments for ordinary murder in many countries,”
even though “extraordinary international crimes are supposedly graver than
international offenses.” See DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 157. I have elsewhere
expressed a related concern about treating international offenders as a closed
universe for purposes of determining sentences. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1125 n.281 (2011).
30
Notably, the statutes of several international criminal tribunals expressly
authorize judges to take account of local sentencing practices. See Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 23, available at
http://www.unictr.org (“In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial
Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences
in the courts of Rwanda.”); Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 24, available at http://www.icty.org (“In
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to
the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia.”); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 19, available at
http://www.sc-sl.org (“In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial
Chamber shall, as appropriate, have recourse to the practice regarding prison
sentences in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the national
courts of Sierra Leone.”).
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sentences, its underlying logic is agnostic about what sentences are
appropriate at the domestic level. There is nothing intrinsic to
retributive theory that dictates whether, as a general matter,
sentences should be harsher or more lenient.31 For instance, when
Anders Behring Breivik received a 21-year sentence for murdering
77 people, he received the highest sentence permissible under
Norwegian law.32 A society like Norway may legislate a maximum
sentence of 21 years for even the worst offenses but rely on
retributive reasoning when distributing punishments within the
permitted range.
It also bears observing that retributive thinking restrains
utilitarian impulses toward harshness. U.S. theorists, for instance,
have invoked retributive theory to decry a variety of practices—
including mandatory minimum sentences, three-strikes-and-yourout-laws, dangerous offender and sexual predator laws, and the
punishment of strict liability offenses, on the ground that these
practices impose suffering not justified by the desert of the
accused.33 The typical focus of international trials on political
leaders charged with crimes of great societal impact carries with it
its own pressures. For example, interests of social harmony might
favor the imposition of harsh punishment on a political leader
widely perceived to have directed mass atrocities, yet retributive
principles will resist this result to the extent it is not justified by the
established desert of the accused.34

31
This is not to say that principles of justice do not impose any absolute
limits on the practice of punishment. For instance, most would agree it is unjust
to impose a lengthy prison sentence for a mere speeding violation, and that some
forms of punishment (for instance, torture) are unjustifiable no matter how
serious the offense. Whether such constraints are intrinsic to retributive theory
itself or instead belong to some other principle of justice is a question outside the
scope of this Article.
32 Mark Lewis & Sarah Lyall, Norway Killer Gets the Maximum: 21 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, at A3.
33
Michael Tonry, Can Twenty-first Century Punishment Policies Be Justified in
Principle?, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FUTURE? 3 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2011).
34 The international tribunal practice has recognized this restraining feature
of retributivism. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A,
Judgment, ¶ 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004), at
1075 (“[U]nlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of restraint;
retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and
nothing more”) (quoting R. v. M. (C.A.) [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, ¶ 80) (emphasis in
original).
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2.2. The Utility of Desert
Another common tendency is to label as retributive approaches
that promote desert-based punishment for instrumental reasons.
Yet as Moore elaborates, retributivism is distinct from the views
that punishment satisfies the thirst for vengeance of victims, or of
society as a whole; that punishment prevents vengeful victims
from taking the law into their own hands; and that punishment
provides the vehicle by which society denounces wrongdoing.35
This dual use of the retributivist label exists even among
scholars who acknowledge the operative distinction. For example,
a recent article by Andrew K. Woods opens with the statement that
“[T]he international criminal regime is deeply retributive.”36 Yet
the remainder of the article makes clear that Woods is not
concerned at all with retributive justifications for ICL.
In
describing the ICL regime as retributive, Woods appears primarily
to mean that this regime is punitive in nature, emphasizes
incarceration as a response to individual criminal responsibility,
and gives short shrift to alternative non-punitive or quasi-punitive
measures.37 The rationale for international criminal justice that
Woods identifies and critiques is one focused on the “utility of
desert,” the idea that desert-based punishment serves a positive
social function by satisfying public demands for retribution.38 As
Woods acknowledges, this is a utilitarian approach to punishment,
and he is “solely concerned here with evaluating the claim that the
regime’s current retributive stance will produce favorable
consequences.”39 Thus, his analysis focuses exclusively on the
possible social benefits of different responses to international
crimes, and gives no attention to what demands, if any,
retributivism itself rightfully has for ICL.40
35
Id. at 88-90. See also John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q.
116 (1979) (covering similar ground and reaching several of the same conclusions).
36 Woods, supra note 7, at 634.
37 Whether Woods is correct even on this point is disputable and depends in
part on how one defines the “international criminal law regime.” See infra notes
200–09 and accompanying text.
38 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453 (1996–1997).
39 Woods, supra note 7, at 634 n.1.
40
A similar limitation partly underlies Robert Sloane’s analysis of
retributivism, which he rejects in favor of an expressive theory of international
sentencing. See Sloane, supra note 3. Of the two variants of retributivism he
identifies, one is a legal-anthropological model and proceeds from the observation

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE)

986

10/13/2014 11:07 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:4

Similarly, Ohlin identifies a Rorshach-like quality according to
which “punishment in international criminal law is at once
retributivist and consequentialist, but at two different levels.”41 On
the one hand, there is the “the basic fact that the guilty deserve to
be punished,” and on the other hand, there is the fact that “the
victims of various conflicts—say the Kurds in Iraq, the Kosovars in
Yugoslavia, the Tutsi in Rwanda—may feel that the guilty deserve
to be punished.”42 This subjective feeling animates a utilitarian
rationale focused on international peace and security: “the point of
international criminal tribunals is, in many cases, to convince
victims to put down their arms and forgo reprisal attacks, and to
submit their grievances to the rule of law.”43 Nevertheless,
observes Ohlin, “at the level of the victims, the justification is
retributive.”44
Ohlin’s characterization provides a useful reminder that
different justifications for punishment may operate simultaneously
for different stakeholders. Political decision-makers may establish
an international criminal tribunal as part of a plan to advance
international peace and security, and others—including victims—
may welcome that decision on purely retributive grounds. But I do
not see, as Ohlin would have it, how the convergence of these
rationales establishes a unique theory of ICL that acknowledges
“the true and ineluctable retributive nature of the criminal
process.”45 Instead, the idea that desert-based punishment has
social utility—common to utility-of-desert approaches at both the
international and domestic levels—remains a utilitarian rationale,
albeit one resting on the assumption that ordinary people accept
retributive theory. This rationale operates independently from the

that “acts of retaliatory violence, if left unchecked, threaten to destroy the social
bonds of the community.” Id. at 78. Thus, punishment “is the means by which
the state terminates the otherwise escalating cycles of retaliatory violence within
its community.” Id. As Sloane acknowledges, this theory, “strictly speaking,
should be regarded as a kind of utilitarianism.” Id.
41 Ohlin, supra note 9, at 390.
42 Id. at 389.
43
Id. Indeed, as Ohlin notes, “This dynamic is central to international
criminal justice, especially since both the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, as
well as binding ICC referrals from the Security Council, are based on the Security
Council’s Chapter VII authority to take measures to restore international peace
and security.” Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 392.
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retributive claim that desert is an intrinsic reason to punish.
2.3. Selective Punishment
Some critiques of retributivism at the international level have
drawn a connection between retributive theory and the regularity
of punishment. Diane Amann notes that “[a]s a result of selectivity
and randomness, just deserts have been meted out inconsistently,
in very few conflicts, and on only a few defendants,” and argues
that “[t]hese factors thus have disserved the goal of retribution.”46
For Mark Drumbl, “the operation of international criminal law
occasions a retributive shortfall in that too few people or entities
receive just deserts while many powerful states and organizations
are absolved of responsibility.”47 As a result,”[t]he retributive
function is hobbled by the fact that only some extreme evil gets
punished, whereas much escapes its grasp, often for political
reasons anathema to Kantian deontology.”48 As both authors
acknowledge, this shortfall has multiple causes and takes different
forms. States are often unwilling to prosecute international
offenses. When they do, or when international tribunals intervene,
the overwhelming scope of mass atrocities combined with the
limited resources and capacity of prosecuting institutions often
ensures that only a tiny fraction of international criminal offenders
will face prosecution.49
Decisions to establish international
criminal tribunals have themselves proceeded on a selective, ad
hoc basis, reflecting, in Amann’s view, “a random confluence of
political concerns.”50 Moreover, the case selection of international
criminal tribunals has consistently faced various accusations—
some more persuasive than others—of political bias.51

Amann, supra note 5, at 117.
DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 153.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Amann, supra note 5, at 116.
51 The post-World War II IMTs focused exclusively on crimes perpetrated by
members of the Axis powers, leading to accusations of “victor’s justice.” See, e.g.,
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
641 (1992) (noting this accusation). The ICTR has received similar criticism for
ignoring crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), the
predecessor of Rwanda’s current government. See Kenneth Roth, ICTR: Address
Crimes Committed by RPF, A Letter to the ICTR Prosecutor, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/11/ictraddress-crimes-committed-rpf (arguing that “[a] failure to [prosecute RPF crimes]
46
47
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Both Amman and Drumbl invoke this selectivity to support
non-retributive approaches to ICL. For Amman, the lesson is that
international criminal tribunals should pursue expressive goals,
issuing judgments that are attuned to the complex social meaning
of criminal justice and that “foster[] acceptance and understanding
of proscriptive norms.”52 For Drumbl, the retributive shortfall
provides one of several reasons for international tribunals to defer
to local solutions, including alternate, non-conventional methods
of addressing past atrocity.53
As regards the policy implications of selective punishment, I
am sympathetic to both arguments,54 but I am less certain that the
problem of selectivity represents either a failure of retributive
theory, or some inherent incompatibility between ICL and
retributivism. Indeed, the problem of selectivity has most obvious
relevance for utilitarian approaches to criminal law.55 As both
authors note, selectivity can undermine the goal of deterrence
whose efficacy depends on the perceived likelihood of punishment
for wrongdoing.56 Similarly, under a utility-of-desert rationale,
would taint the perception of the Tribunal’s impartiality in carrying out its
mandate and thereby undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of future generations”).
Despite prosecuting offenses committed by all sides to the former Yugoslav
conflicts, the ICTY has faced accusations of anti-Serb bias among Serbs. See, e.g.,
Attitudes Towards War Crimes Issues, ICTY and the National Judiciary, Ipsos Strategic
Marketing, OSCE (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.osce.org/serbia/90422
(indicating through a public opinion survey, inter alia, that 40% of Serbian
respondents believe that the primary purpose of the ICTY is “to put the blame for
war sufferings on Serbs,” that 49% of respondents believe that Serbia should not
cooperate with the ICTY, that only 16% believe Serbia should cooperate in order
“to achieve justice,” and that 73% believe the ICTY has a “different attitude
toward individuals indicted for war crimes depending on their ethnicity”). The
ICC, moreover, continues to face accusations of anti-African bias resulting from
the fact that all its cases and investigations have dealt with crimes committed in
Africa. See, e.g., Katrina Manson & Addis Ababa, AU Chief Accuses International
Criminal Court of Chasing Africans, FIN. TIMES, May 27, 2013.
52 Amann, supra note 5, at 133.
53 DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 149, 181.
54 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 7.
55 This was a point emphasized by early utilitarian thinker, Cesare Beccaria,
who argued that the prevailing punishment practices of his day lacked sufficient
certainty to ensure effective deterrence. See Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and
Punishment, in ALESSANDRO MANZONI, THE COLUMN OF INFAMY 11 (Kenlem Foster
& Jane Grigson trans., 1964) (1764). See also Noam Wiener, Theories of
Punishment in the Practice of International Criminal Tribunals 31-34 (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author).
56
See Amann, supra note 5, at 23 (arguing that “Both [retributive and
deterrent] objectives depend on enforcement, and for many decades after
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punishment might fail to quench the public thirst for vengeance if
provided in insufficient quantity. Both these considerations can
provide powerful arguments in favor of expressive strategies or
alternatives to international criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, the implications of a shortfall for retributivism
itself are less clear. In the first place, the fact that a great majority
of the guilty escape punishment, does not by itself clarify which
rationale guides the punishment of those who are prosecuted. If
the guilty are punished because of their desert, then retributivism
continues to supply a plausible account of international criminal
justice, at least with respect to those suspects.57
In addition, as Drumbl acknowledges, selectivity is also a
pervasive feature of domestic criminal justice.58 The mere fact that
international justice reflects greater—even substantially greater—59
selectivity than domestic justice does not ipso facto defeat the
retributive rationale for punishment, unless one can first establish
that retributivism imposes some threshold of selectivity beyond
which it becomes inapplicable. Moore, for one, has denied that any
such requirement inheres in retributivism itself, and includes the
principle of equality in his list of non-retributive ideas. As he
observes, the principle of formal justice, dictating that “if we
punish anyone, we must do so equally,” addresses a different issue
than does retributivism’s attempt to explain “[w]hy we should
punish anyone.”60
Nuremberg, the international community did not enforce international criminal
law. Although that has changed, contemporary enforcement is limited by two
factors often lumped together as “selectivity”); Drumbl, supra note 4, at 151
(“[S]electivity poses a greater challenge to international criminal law than it does
to national criminal law”) (footnote omitted).
57
See DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 150 (“Retribution is the dominant stated
objective for punishment of atrocity perpetrators at the national and international
levels.”); deGuzman, supra note 2, at 303 (“Even national systems do not punish
all wrongdoers, but retribution can justify the punishment they do inflict. In the
same way, retribution provides some justification for ICC adjudication even if the
ICC cannot inflict retribution on all those who deserve it and the punishments it
awards do not always appear satisfactory in terms of proportionality.”).
58 DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 151.
59 See deGuzman, supra note 2, at 269 (“Given the massive numbers of cases
national courts prosecute, only very exceptionally will a selection decision spark
challenges to the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. . . . In contrast,
since the ICC is limited to prosecuting a handful of cases out of thousands of
potential cases, each selection attracts substantial attention.”).
60 MOORE, supra note 22, at 90. Of course, one may be a “retributivist who
also subscribes to the principle of formal justice.” Id.
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None of this is to say, however, that the problem of
selectivity—in all its guises—is irrelevant to a retributivist’s views
on ICL.
But the more pertinent question is not whether
retributivism is compatible with conditions of selectivity, but
instead how commitments to retributive justice are best reconciled
with an international criminal justice system that, like all criminal
justice systems, is necessarily selective. This is a question that I
consider in greater detail below, and I argue that there is greater
flexibility to retributive theory than might be supposed. Indeed, as
I shall elaborate, both Amman’s and Drumbl’s specific policy
prescriptions may be recharacterized as options within a generally
retributive approach to ICL.
3.

POLITICAL RETRIBUTIVSM

A different sort of challenge to international criminal
retributivism has to do with the political theory of international
justice.
One major variant of retributive theory roots the
justification of punishment in social contract theory, and thus rests
on certain presuppositions about the nature of the political
community that administers criminal justice. This contractarian
approach dates to Immanuel Kant—widely considered the father
of retributive theory—who justified the state’s coercive authority
as deriving from the moral imperative to punish violations of the
freedoms guaranteed by the social contract implicitly accepted by
rights bearing citizens of the state.61 Justifications of this nature
present a challenge for international criminal tribunals, which are
creatures of the international community and operate at the
supranational level, sometimes without the consent of the state
most closely connected to the crimes in question. In addition, the
contexts of mass criminality that typically inspire international
prosecution tend to rupture the political community in ways not
accomplished by ordinary domestic crimes.
Anthony Duff and Robert Sloane have both seized upon these
61
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (John Ladd trans., 2d

ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I
ed. 1999) (1797) (elaborating
Kant’s views on punishment). This, at least, is the theory commonly associated
with Kant. Some of his writings indicate a more utilitarian approach to
punishment. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 512–18 (1987) (identifying utilitarian strains in Kant’s writings on
criminal justice). For a summary of contractarian approaches to criminal law, see
GUYORA BINDER, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO US LAW: CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming
2015).
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unique features of the international regime to question whether
retributive justifications for ICL can survive the transition from the
national to the international stage. Although their arguments
overlap to some degree they remain distinct and require separate
consideration.
3.1. The Political Legitimacy of International Tribunals
For Duff, the central problem is the lack of legitimacy on the
part of the international courts that sometimes try ICL offenses.
He argues that “defendants are answerable to their fellow citizens
(in whose names the courts act) for public wrongs that they
commit, in virtue of their shared membership of the political
community.”62 “The criminal trial,” he continues, “is the forum in
which we formally call each other to account, as citizens, for such
wrongs.”63 It is this shared political community that provides a
theory of jurisdiction, explaining why English courts may
prosecute English thieves, but why “the theft committed by a
Polish citizen against a fellow Pole in Poland is not morally, as it is
not legally, within the jurisdiction of English courts.”64
The trouble with international criminal trials, on Duff’s
account, is that the international community is not itself a political
community that benefits from the same type of shared citizenship,
and thus it is not clear in many cases that international courts are
any better situated to conduct trials than is Duff’s hypothetical
English court that asserts jurisdiction over Polish citizens in
Poland. Although Duff observes that an international court like
the ICC might claim a surrogate role—“acting on behalf of the
political communities which [national] courts fail to represent as
they should”—he reasons that this explanation still leaves
unanswered the question of “by what right can [the ICC] claim to
act in [the political community’s] name?”65
Duff does
62 Anthony Duff, Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 595 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010).
63 Id.
64 Id. Notably Duff does not explore the implications of his theory for more
complex transnational scenarios, such as when a Polish citizen robs an English
citizen in New York City.
65
Id. at 599. Duff also notes a separate problem concerning the possible
nature of the community on whose behalf the ICC acts: “just when the arguments
for international jurisdiction seem strongest, there might be doubt about whether
there exists a political community to which the perpetrator could answer.” Id.
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acknowledge that one might answer this question by recognizing
humanity as a normative community that does not rise to the level
of a political community, and he indicates that international
criminal trials ultimately rely on this aspiration.
He then
concludes somewhat ambiguously by emphasizing that “when we
think about just what that aspiration involves, we must realize
how morally demanding it is.”66
A full assessment of these arguments is beyond the scope of
this Article and, I believe, unnecessary to its central claims. For my
purposes, several points deserve mention. First, Duff’s challenge is
a broad one leveled against ICL as a whole, and not merely against
retributivist accounts of ICL. Indeed, his account implicitly calls
into question much broader developments in international law,
such as the rise of human rights law, which is premised on the idea
that the international community as a whole has a stake in how
individual states treat their own citizens, and may legitimately
demand respect for universal human rights, as well as remedies for
their breach at both the international and domestic levels. It also
calls into question the institutional mechanisms underlying ICL—
such as consent-based treaties and U.N. Security Council
enforcement—by which states limit their sovereignty more
broadly.67 If one endorses this broad attack on the international
For instance, “crimes against humanity could surely involve such systematic,
successful attacks that there really is no basis left on which to identify a political
community to which their perpetrators ought to answer.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Notwithstanding this observation, Duff appears unwilling to
conclude that the legal consequence of such a campaign should be freedom from
prosecution by any court whatsoever and he concludes, without elaboration, that
“such perpetrators should not escape being called to account.” Id. Duff’s
hesitation on this point raises a broader question about how thick a concept of
political community his theory requires. Regardless, the idea that even such
perpetrators should be prosecuted would seem to cut strongly in favor of
legitimating international trials that do so, either based on a more expansive
political retributivism or by appealing to pre-political moral retributivism.
66 Id. at 604.
67 The U.N. Security Council established both the ICTY and ICTR pursuant
to its authority to safeguard international peace and security under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(establishing the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994)
(establishing the ICTR). The ICC is a treaty-based institution whose jurisdiction is
limited to crimes committed on the territory of or by a citizen of a state party, the
only exception being if the U.N. Security Council has acted under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter to refer a situation to the Court. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
arts. 12-13 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. So-called hybrid tribunals operate with the
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legal system, it is no answer to shift from retributive justifications
to utilitarian ones. As such, the argument does little to address the
principal claims of this Article, which presuppose the baseline
legitimacy of the international legal order, such as it is, and focus
on the comparative contribution of retributive thinking for ICL as
opposed to other approaches to punishment.68
Second, if one accepts—as I and many others do—that a
sufficient sense of common humanity does permit the international
community to vindicate certain universal human rights, including,
in appropriate circumstances, by holding criminal trials of
individuals accused of specified international offenses, then
contractarian retributivism will not operate to preclude ICL,
although it will provide guidance regarding its appropriate reach.
Adil Haque, for example, has advanced a “relational” theory of
ICL, focused on cases “[w]hen the state is either a tool of group
conflict or a passive observer to such conflict,” and it accordingly
“fails to discharge its role as a neutral source of retributive justice
with the ability to prevent cycles of group retaliation for past
violence.”69 This approach relies on precisely the type of claim to a
common moral community that gives Duff pause. It embraces the
“sociological premise” that the post-World War II world is one “in
which the moral status of individuals is seen to rest not on religion,
nationality, or other social group membership, but on a common
humanity,” and, hence, “that just as the state supplanted the clan
as the foundational moral community, the state has been
supplanted in turn.”70 Other justifications of ICL track similar

consent of the state to whose territory the tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited. See
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
137; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329
U.N.T.S. 117; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic
on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
68
If anything, Duff’s critique reinforces my broader claim that a range of
attitudes about international criminal law are consistent with retributive
commitments. A retributivist who accepts Duff’s account of political legitimacy
will oppose many international criminal trials even in cases where such
prosecutions are the only feasible means of achieving retribution for grave
wrongdoing.
69 Haque, supra note 8, at 296.
70 Id. at 296-97.
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lines, emphasizing both a sense of common humanity, and a view
that international institutions may appropriately intervene in cases
of structural failure, where states have failed in their primary
obligation to protect their populations.71
Third, the implications of Duff’s critique are less clear for
retributive accounts, such as Michael Moore’s, that emphasize the
pre-political moral intuition that punishing grave wrongdoing is
intrinsically the right thing to do.72 Whether pre-political moral
intuitions of this sort are sufficient to anchor a coherent approach
to punishment is a disputed matter.73 Nevertheless, the strong
moral intuition that those who commit mass atrocities should be
punished is at least arguably a relevant, if not exclusive, factor in
shoring up the legitimacy of international prosecutorial efforts. At
minimum, one can invoke this intuition as evidence that a
sufficient sense of common humanity does indeed exist to support
a retributivist model along the lines that Haque has proposed.
3.2. The Fair Play Model of Contractarian Justice
Sloane’s critique focuses specifically on Herbert Morris’s “fair
play” or “benefits and burdens” model of criminal justice, which is
perhaps the most prominent modern adaptation of Kantian
punishment theory.74 This contractarian model posits that one
who violates rules designed to benefit the community acquires an
unfair advantage: the violator enjoys the benefits protections
afforded to all subjects of the legal system while also “renouncing

71
For a survey of the literature, see Kai Ambos, Punishment Without a
Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue of International Criminal Law: A First Contribution
Towards a Consistent Theory of International Criminal Law, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
(2013). Ambos traces this approach back to Kant himself. See id. at 314 (“A
supranational ius puniendi can be inferred from a combination of the incipient
stages of supranationality of a valued-based world order and the concept of a
world society composed of world citizens whose law—the ‘world citizen law’
(Weltbürgerrecht)—is derived from universal, indivisible and interculturally
recognized human rights predicated upon a Kantian concept of human dignity.”).
72 See generally MOORE, supra note 22.
73
See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic
Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 22 (2012) (“My sense is that these capsule
summaries, especially with their attending emphases on moral desert, are
incapable of serving as a persuasive account that could justify state punishment
from a retributive perspective.”).
74
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 4, 475 (1968);
Sloane, supra note 3, at 80.
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what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint.”75 The
purpose of punishment, therefore, is to “[restore] the equilibrium
of benefits and burdens by taking from the individual what he
owes, that is, exacting a debt.”76
Unlike Duff, Sloane does not question the political legitimacy
of international criminal tribunals per se, but he argues that the
types of mass atrocity crimes that typically give rise to
international criminal prosecutions are themselves a poor fit for the
fair play model.
He urges that “it would be bizarre to
conceptualize the génocidaire as a freerider on the hypothetical
social contract of others not to destroy national, ethnic, racial, or
religious groups, or to regard a serious human rights abuser as
arrogating to himself a benefit that others voluntarily relinquished
in their common interest,”77 and also that “conceptualizing the war
criminal or génocidaire as a deviant from social norms may make
little sense where the criminal conduct would be more accurately
described as conforming to a norm that prevails within the
criminal’s literal community, be it national, ethnic, racial, or
martial.”78 Sloane further underlines that the state is often
complicit in international crimes, and thus does not act as “the
societal entity ensuring a just distribution of benefits and burdens,
but on the contrary, as a prime force disrupting that distribution.”79
Sloane’s critique is a nuanced and targeted one. His analysis
does not lead him to reject ICL as a whole, but instead to favor, an
alternate, expressivist, justification for international criminal
tribunals.80 His focus on Morris’ particular approach, moreover,

75 Morris, supra note 74, at 478; Sloane, supra note 3, at 80 (quoting Morris).
Others have endorsed this approach as well. See generally Wojciech Sadurski,
Theory of Punishment, Social Justice, and Liberal Neutrality, in PUNISHMENT (Anthony
Duff ed., 1993); GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1989).
76 Morris, supra note 74, at 478; Sloane, supra note 3, at 80 (quoting Morris).
77 Sloane, supra note 3, at 80.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 81.
80 Indeed, there is some debate about whether the fair play model is in fact
retributive. Scholars, such as Michael Moore and John Cottingham, have
embraced it as such, albeit with some qualification on the latter’s part. See MOORE,
supra note 22, at 107 (“It is true that if Morris succeeds he will have shown the
intrinsic goodness of retribution—that is, that retribution is good in-and-of itself,
and not because it is instrumental to the attainment of something else that is
good”) (emphasis in original); Cottingham, supra note 35, at 243, 236 (noting that
“the immediate focus . . . [of the fair play model] thus centers not on the offender
but on the law-abiding citizen,” yet maintaining the model is indirectly
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leaves open the possibility that other variants of retributive theory
could survive his critique. Nonetheless, I am not convinced that
the problems he identifies with the fair play account are unique to
ICL, or that the conditions he identifies are quite so irreconcilable
with the model.
In the first place, one could characterize certain episodes of
mass atrocity in ways that better fit the theory. For example, a
head of state who consolidates political power by directing a
genocide against a minority population has gained a tangible
advantage from his crimes that will be counteracted to some
degree by incarceration. That the leader has acted with the
overwhelming support of the non-victim population may not be
fatal to the theory if one agrees that the leader has violated a norm
that objectively benefits society (for example, the norm privileging
a tolerant multi-cultural society over a genocidal homogenous
society), even if most members of the community, as a subjective
matter, do not endorse the norm as applied to the particular case in
question. Indeed, a portion of the leader’s culpability may lie in
the very fact that he has injured society by cultivating a climate in
which genocide has become socially acceptable. So framed, this
scenario of social instability can still speak of unfair advantage and
community harm brought about by the norm violation.

retributivist on the ground that “the means actually chosen for upholding fairness
is to make the offender ‘pay’ for the unfair advantage,” and further that the fair
play model has “the best chance of providing a non-utilitarian rationale for the
practice of punishment”). Others, such as Leo Zaibert and George Sher, are not so
sure. By depicting punishment as the payment of a debt to society, the fair play
model mirrors utilitarian approaches by emphasizing the social benefits of
punishment. It is in this way difficult to square Morris’s concern for “maintaining
and restoring a fair distribution of benefits and burdens” with a view that it is the
desert of the criminal rather than the achievement of social benefits that justifies
punishment. Morris, supra note 74, at 483. Leo Zaibert, PUNISHMENT AND
RETRIBUTION 119 (2005) (“I find it difficult to accept that Morris’ fair play version
of retributivism is not, in the final analysis, concerned with consequences, just like
any form of consequentialism. Morris after all admits, repeatedly, that the
justification of punishment is ‘related to maintaining and restoring a fair
distribution of benefits and burdens [in society].’ But the maintenance of this fair
distribution of benefits and burdens in society strikes me as a consequence, or a
‘good end,’ of punishment in precisely the sense that Moore wishes to deny it
is.”); SHER, supra note 75, at 75 (observing that Morris “construes punishment’s
aim as controlling behavior” and that the fair play model therefore has “a strongly
consequentialist element”). Note also that even John Cottingham, who describes
the fair play model as indirectly retributivist, is ambivalent in his conclusion,
observing that “if this approach is to be characterized as ‘retributivist,’ enormous
caution is needed.” See Cottingham, supra note 35, at 121.
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Of course, to adapt the theory in this way requires some
conceptual choices. It involves appealing to the objective interests
of a society that is itself somewhat notional, rather than to the
subjectively perceived interests of its individual members who
may no longer consider themselves part of a common society. This
adaptation only goes so far. As Duff observes, “crimes against
humanity could surely involve such systematic, successful attacks
that there really is no basis left on which to identify a political
community,” yet he also concludes that “such perpetrators should
not escape being called to account.”81
The more fundamental issue, in my view, is that the fair play
model is not that compelling to begin with, even without
considering the special circumstances of ICL. As J.L. Mackie has
argued, “The trouble with this approach . . . is that it has little
relation to most cases of punishment,” because it implies that
punishment must be proportional to the advantage gained by the
criminal, rather than to the wrongness of his act.82 As Mackie
notes, the theory suggests that “if a businessman has secured a
contract worth $100,000, but has exceeded the speed limit in order
to get to the relevant appointment on time, he should presumably
be fined $100,000, whereas a fine of $1 would be enough for
someone who murders a blind cripple to rob him of $1.”83 On this
account, the trouble with the fair play approach is that it
emphasizes “the advantage that may have been gained by the
criminal in some sort of social competition, whereas the point of
punishment surely lies not in this but in wrongness of his act and
the harm that he has done or tried to do.”84 Similarly, a
retributivist theory of ICL will also do better to focus on the
wrongness of ICL offenses and to invoke the shared moral status of
a common humanity as the fundamental justification for the

Duff, supra note 62, at 600.
J.L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 680 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991).
83
Id. One might counter that Mackie has mischaracterized the relevant
benefits. For instance, perhaps the benefit claimed by the driver is merely the
ability to drive faster (and with greater risk to others) than permitted, whereas the
murder’s advantage is that the dead victim cannot prevent the theft. I am grateful
to Noam Wiener for these examples.
84
Id. See also Duff, supra note 62, at 600 (“[A] rapist should be condemned
and punished not for the social volatility or loss of trust that he caused, nor for the
unfair advantage that he supposedly took over those who restrain their criminal
impulses, but for the wrong that he did to the person whom he raped.”).
81
82
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establishment of these offenses and their related international
institutions.
4.

INSTITUTIONAL RETRIBUTIVISM

The basic definition I have outlined provides a means of
distinguishing retributive justifications from consequentialist ones.
And as I have just described, common criticisms of retributivism in
the international literature fail to demonstrate why desert based
reasoning is any less compatible with international prosecutions
than it is with domestic prosecutions. Nevertheless, this basic
account of retributivism also remains incomplete in significant
ways. In particular, it does not specify the weight that desert plays
in punishment decisions. Does desert justify punishment in the
minimalist sense of being merely necessary to punishment, or does
it provide a sufficient, perhaps exclusive reason to punish?
Depending on how one answers this question, retributivism is
vulnerable to the critique—far more devastating than the
objections leveled by international scholars—that the theory is of
almost no use to decision makers charged with the establishment,
design, support, and administration of real world justice
institutions, be it at the domestic or international level. To obtain a
more complete picture of how a retributivist might view ICL, one
must go beyond the accounts of retributivism found in the ICL
literature.
This Part examines the international institutional implications
of five retributivist models. As the diverse conclusions reached
under these models reveal, there is no single retributive theory of
criminal justice institutions, and thus there can be no single
retributive approach to ICL. Nevertheless, two basic trends are
apparent. First, the understandings of retributivism that are most
plausible for domestic law are likewise the most plausible for
international law. Accordingly, the international setting does not
pose any unique obstacles for retributive theory.
Second,
retributivist theory is compatible with a substantially larger range
of opinion about international criminal justice efforts than might be
supposed.
4.1. Minimalism
I first consider the minimalist version of retributivism,
according to which blameworthiness is merely a necessary
condition of punishment. This type of retributivism has been
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variously referred to as “weak retributivism,”85 “negative
retributivism,”86 or “side constrainted”87 retributivism because it
does not provide an affirmative rationale for punishment. Instead,
it merely prohibits the punishment of the innocent, and as a
corollary, the imposition of punishment beyond what is justified
by the offender’s desert. A related, slightly stronger version,
maintains that wrongdoing permits, but does not demand,
punishment.88
The minimalist model’s implications for real world criminal
justice would appear to be quite limited, because no one seriously
argues that it is justifiable to deliberately punish the innocent.
Nevertheless, as I have already noted, the culpability principle
provides a powerful critique of practices that punish the guilty in
excess of what they deserve.89
ICL, by contrast, presents in many ways a more obvious fit for
retributivist approaches. Prosecutions focus on especially grave
instances of violent crimes such as murder, torture, and rape that
are paradigmatic malum in se offenses.90 There is broad agreement,
moreover, that convictions and sentences must rest on
considerations of individual blameworthiness.91 This commitment
can provoke disagreement in particular contexts.
A major
challenge for ICL concerns how to assign individual responsibility
in cases of mass criminality involving varying degrees of
participation by countless participants. Particular debate has
focused on the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise whose outer

HLA HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (2d ed. 2008).
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism and the State’s Interest in Punishment, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE NOMOS XXVII 159 (Jr. Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1985).
87 R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 11 (2003).
88 See Mackie, supra note 82, at 680.
89 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
90
For example, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 67, at arts. 5-8.
91
See, e.g., KAI AMBOS, 1 TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 2011 (2013) (“In general, international criminal
tribunals have recognized since Nuremberg that criminal responsibility
presupposes criminal guilt or culpability.”); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1A, Judgment, ¶ 186 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999)
(“The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national
systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal
culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in
which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla
poena sine culpa).”).
85
86
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reaches, as developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), permit the conviction of relatively
minor participants in criminal enterprises for the foreseeable
offenses of others committed outside the common plan.92 There is
also debate concerning standards for superior responsibility, which
can hold military commanders responsible for the offenses of
subordinates that the commander negligently failed to prevent.93
These debates, however, are more about the reach of the
culpability principle than about its desirability. In other words,
they reflect different understandings of criminal culpability rather
than a disagreement over whether culpability is necessary to
punishment.
These retributive features of ICL only go so far, however. A
purely negative retributivism imposes important limitations on the
criminal justice system, but it does not provide a rationale for
punishment. It cannot explain why punishment is ever desirable,
much less provide practical guidance on far more specific
questions such as when it is desirable to establish an international
criminal tribunal and what crimes that tribunal should prosecute.
Necessarily, the minimalist model relies on non-retributive

92
The ICTY Appeals Chamber first announced this doctrine in the Tadic
case. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). Pursuant to this mode of participation, an
accused is held criminally responsible for an international crime based on his or
her participation, with the requisite mens rea, in a common plan among a plurality
of persons to commit the crime. See id. ¶¶ 227–28. Most controversially, the Court
held that participants in a JCE are also liable for crimes outside the common plan
committed by other members of the group so long as the commission of the
offense was foreseeable and the accused knowingly took the risk of its occurrence.
Id. ¶ 228. On the controversy surrounding the ICTY’s development of JCE, see
generally MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY 48–90 (2009); Allison
Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 75 (2005); Verena Haan, The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal
Enterprise at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 167 (2005); Jens David Ohlin, Joint Criminal Confusion, 12 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 406 (2009); Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of
Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007); Darryl Robinson, The
Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008).
93
See, e.g., Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 493 (2001) (explaining that, while negligence in preventing
criminal acts of one’s subordinates can invoke superior responsibility, it is unclear
whether there can be superior liability for the failure to punish); Danner &
Martinez, supra note 92, at 129 (highlighting the confusion superior responsibility
causes).
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reasoning to guide these and other questions.
Moreover, this is not an account of retributivism that many
self-professed retributivists embrace as adequate.94
Michael
Moore, the best-known modern proponent of a maximalist
retributivism, has rejected the idea that a justification for
punishment may be constructed on the combination of
retributivism and utilitarian rationales such as crime prevention.
“Retributivism has no room for such other reasons,” he argues.95
That punishment might prevent crime is merely “a happy surplus
for the retributivist, but no part of the justification for punishing.”96
On this account, retributivism provides a sufficient, and not merely
a necessary condition of punishment.97 Moreover, the “moral
responsibility also gives society the duty to punish,” whereby
“[r]etributivism . . . is only a theory of justice, such that, if it is true,
we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is
achieved.”98
In the remainder of this Part, I consider the possibilities and
implications for ICL of a more robust retributivism, one that,
following along the lines identified by Moore, provides firmer
guidance in the establishment and administration of justice
institutions than does the minimalist version of retributivism.
4.2. A Duty to Punish
The version of retributivism that Moore himself embraces is
deontological: it posits an a priori moral duty to punish the
deserving. Moore describes this duty as “agent relative” in that it
94
See Cahill, supra note 11, at 826 (“Retributivist literature is rife with
references to the principle of desert-based punishment as a moral duty and to the
corresponding claim that the retributive principle does not merely authorize
punishment but affirmatively calls for its imposition on those who deserve it.”);
see also id. at 826 nn.33-35 (citing Hegel, Kant, and more recent theorists for this
view of retributivism); Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving, 26 Noûs 4,
447-64, 453 n.11 (1992) (“Some philosophers distinguish positive retributivism,
according to which criminality is sufficient to justify punishment, from negative
retributivism, according to which criminality is necessary to justify punishment.
Others define retributivism so that the latter is not a form of retributivism at all.”).
95 MOORE, supra note 22, at 88-89.
96 Id. at 89.
97
See id. at 88 (“The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral
desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him or her; the principle
Quinton advocates makes such moral desert merely a necessary condition of
punishment.”).
98 Id. at 91.
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“regards the act of punishing the guilty as categorically demanded
on each occasion, considered separately.”99
What does this duty demand, and how, precisely, does one
honor the obligation “to set up institutions so that retribution is
achieved?”
4.2.1. Absolutism
Michael Cahill observes that one possible interpretation of this
duty is absolutist, placing all individual actors in the justice system
under an obligation to avoid all failures of desert.100 This absolutist
approach “creates a clear affirmative goal for the application of the
retributive principle: punish everybody who deserves it, to the full
extent of their desert.”101 But the problem, immediately apparent,
is that the duty imposes an impossible goal.102 Moreover, argues
Cahill, the absolutist version of retributivism provides no means of
setting priorities concerning which crimes to punish, because the
obligation to prosecute a pickpocket is just as absolute as the
obligation to prosecute a mass murderer. The result in the real
world is a “practical fiasco.”103
Applied to ICL, this fiasco borders on incoherence. The kind of
absolutist model that Cahill describes is incapable of setting
priorities between crimes is likewise incapable of providing the
sort of jurisdictional theory underlying ICL, which by its nature
rests on a division of labor between domestic and international
authority. If retributivist obligations can be globalized, and do not
presuppose obligations specific to a particular political community,
then every state might be obligated to punish all offenses
committed anywhere in the world. Perhaps, as Cahill suggests, the
absolutist model might favor a counterintuitive policy of
prosecuting those who can be caught and prosecuted most easily,
99
Id. at 156. See also Cahill, supra note 11, at 826 (“Retributivist literature is
rife with references to the principle of desert-based punishment as a moral duty
and to the corresponding claim that the retributive principle does not merely
authorize punishment but affirmatively calls for its imposition on those who
deserve it.”).
100 Cahill, supra note 11, at 826.
101 Id. at 828.
102
Id. (“In practice . . . limitations of resources, evidence, and knowledge
make this goal impossible to achieve. Even if we wanted to punish every
wrongdoer or offender, we could not find them all or muster sufficient proof of
their crimes.”).
103 Id. at 857.
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irrespective of the gravity of their offenses.104 In that case, the
model would disfavor ICL in favor of domestic efforts to punish
perpetrators of small-scale ordinary offenses.
This insight is of little consequence, however, because it does
nothing to defuse the general impracticality of the absolutist model
at whatever level of government one applies it. Indeed, this
absolutist model is not one that has any identifiable champions. It
serves instead as a heuristic, one that challenges the coherence of
retributivism, much in the way that the specter of punishing the
innocent challenges the adequacy of utilitarian approaches.
4.2.2. Agent-Relativism
One response among deontologists to the practical limitations
of real world justice is to emphasize that the duty to punish is an
agent-relative one that is only violated by an intentional or
knowing failure to punish a culpable individual.105
This
qualification opens up various possibilities whereby certain
failures to punish are not governed by the duty, and certain
government functions lie outside the retributive obligation. For
example, Moore argues that a judge imposing a sentence is bound
by retributive duties, but a legislature that diverts funds away
from the justice system to health care is not.106 Offenders will
escape justice on account of the legislature’s actions, but the
legislative decision does not, under this variant, reflect an
intentional failure to punish the deserving.107 As Cahill explores,
104

Id. at 849.

[T]he absolutist model’s enforcement scheme would probably
concentrate its focus on the per-offender cost of apprehension. The
severity of the crime in question should not enter the calculus, for in the
absolutist account, the duty to punish wrongdoing is categorical and
therefore applies to all offenses, great and small. Facing constraints on
its ability to punish all deserving offenders, the model’s second-best
alternative would be to satisfy the duty to punish in as many cases as
possible—that is, to maximize the number of deserving offenders
receiving punishment. Id.
105 MOORE, supra note 22, at 158 (“Agent-relative moral norms bind us
absolutely only with respect to evils we either intend or (on some versions)
knowingly visit on specified individuals.”).
106 Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1523, 1552 n.79 (2007).
107 In Kantian terms, the legislature would at most be subject to an imperfect
duty to pursue criminal justice, a duty that, like the obligation to help the poor
and pursue other good ends, is enforceable and does not require the performance
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versions of deontological punishment theory, including some
mixed theories of criminal law, also allow for more utilitarian
thinking on the part of police officers and prosecutors, avoiding
the logistical fiasco of absolute retributivism.108 These limitations,
of course, reflect a substantial qualification of Moore’s claims that
“[r]etributivism has no room for . . . other reasons”109 and that
society has an “obligation to set up institutions so that retribution
is achieved.”110
How might this limited duty translate to the international
setting? In the first place, this retributivism does not supply a
theory of jurisdiction to advocate the establishment of ICL and its
associated institutions. If retributivist obligations do not guide
legislative resource allocations, then the deontologist cannot
explain why a society should affirmatively choose to expend
resources on the establishment of special international criminal
tribunals charged with prosecuting specialized international
offenses. The same, of course, might be said of domestic courts, in
the sense that a legislature might in theory decline to allocate any
funds whatsoever toward criminal justice. But this prospect is not
just a fanciful hypothetical for international criminal tribunals,
which have not existed for most of human history, and operate
now as fragile institutions, with limited budgets and limited
enforcement capability, and with inordinate resources expended
on the trial of a small handful of offenders.
The deontological approach offers the most concrete guidance
to judges who, with institutions already in place, and prosecutorial
charging decisions already made, are tasked with reaching verdicts
and imposing sentences. A retributivist will demand that desertbased reasoning guide these decisions. Yet even here, the duty to
punish is vulnerable to frustration by limitations that are
legislative in character. Prosecutions at the ICC, for example, are
subject to various jurisdictional and admissibility requirements.
Suspects can only be charged with a limited set of crimes and only

of any specific act. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (1785), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE
WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT 75 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 2005); Wiener, supra note 55,
at 180-81.
108 Cahill, supra note 11, at 836-40.
109 MOORE, supra note 22, at 88-89.
110 Id. at 91.
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under certain circumstances.111 The Preamble to the Rome Statute,
indicates that the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the “most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole.”112 An otherwise admissible case must be dismissed, for
example, if it lacks “sufficient gravity.”113 Accordingly, ICC judges
remain under an obligation to dismiss cases that fail these statutory
criteria even if doing so will allow the suspect to escape justice. To
the extent that much or all of legislative decision-making is not
subject to retributive duties, those establishing the rules ex ante
may impose legal obligations requiring judges, when confronted
with particular cases, to commit prima facie violations of their
retributive duties.
A starker example presents itself in Rwanda’s efforts to address
the genocide committed against its Tutsi population in 1994. Faced
with many tens of thousands more suspects in pre-trial detention
than its overburdened court system could possibly try in a manner
consistent with basic due process protections,114 Rwanda
established a mandatory plea bargaining scheme according to
which suspects who confessed became entitled to reduced
sentences imposed by informal village tribunals known as Gacaca

111
112
113
114

Rome Statute, supra note 67.
Id. at pmbl.
Id. at art. 17.
A 2011 Human Rights Watch Report summarizes the situation as follows:

Tens of thousands of suspects were arrested after the genocide, often on
the basis of a single unsubstantiated accusation of participation in the
genocide.
The number of detainees grew rapidly and quickly
overwhelmed the prison system. By October 1994, an estimated 58,000
persons were detained in prison space intended for 12,000, and by 1998,
the number of prisoners had reached around 130,000.
Extreme
overcrowding and lack of sanitation, food, and medical care created
conditions that were universally acknowledged to be inhumane and
which claimed thousands of lives. Many persons were held for years
without charge and without their cases being investigated.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED: THE LEGACY OF RWANDA’S
COMMUNITY-BASED
GACACA
COURTS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0511webwcover_0.pdf.
“In December 1996 the government began to prosecute genocide suspects in
conventional courts. By early 1998, only 1,292 persons had been judged and
relatively few people had confessed to their crimes. The authorities realized that,
at this rate, it would take decades to prosecute the large number of detainees.” Id.
at 13-14. The report also notes that Rwandan authorities “turned down proposals
for foreign judges and other legal personnel to work alongside Rwandan judicial
officials to help speed up the process.” Id. at 14.
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courts.115 For many participants, the Gacaca trials resulted in no
additional jail time beyond that already served in pre-trial
detention.116
How should a deontologist assess Rwanda’s response to mass
atrocity? A judge who intentionally sentences murderers to terms
far below that which the legal system generally demands would
appear to violate her duty to punish. Yet, if legislative actions
remain outside the duty, then the Gacaca system provides an
effective end run around this restraint. Judges accused of violating
their duty to punish may blame the legislature for failing to supply
them with the necessary legal authority. The legislature, in turn,
may point to the absence of any duty to act otherwise. In this way,
the Gacaca trials proceed without any violation of the agent-relative
obligation imposed by the deontological model of retributivism.
One might counter, however, that the Gacaca trials present a
case where even the legislative action is subject to retributive
obligations. This is not, after all, a mere failure to fund. The
legislature has instead taken the affirmative measure of creating an
alternative system of justice, one established ex post in response to
known crimes committed by a known set of perpetrators. This
distinction is plausible, but it rests on an action/inaction
distinction that has its own difficulties. The most serious is that it
fails to provide an attractive explanation of how Rwanda should
go about addressing the underlying dilemma that inspired its
unique legislative response to genocide. The counterintuitive
implication is that the retributivist will tolerate impunity for the
vast majority of perpetrators as the best non-duty-violating option.
The legislature may simply fail to act, maintaining a status-quo in
which the court system is unable to provide most suspects with
trials that comport with due process.
Apart from the question of legislative responsibilities, there
remains the problem of how the deontological understanding
guides the actions of other officials, such as investigators and
prosecutors. Either they are also exempt from any obligation to
punish offenders, and free to set enforcement priorities and pursue
case selection on utilitarian grounds—in which case the retributive
rationale translates only into a very limited judicial doctrine—or,

115 See id. at 19-20 (summarizing legislative background of Rwanda’s Gacaca
trials); id. at 73-80 (summarizing sentencing provisions).
116 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 7, 624-25.
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retributivism remains subject to the same critique as under the
absolutist model; namely, that it imposes an impossible duty.117
4.3. Consequentialist Retributivism
In addition to defending a deontological retributivism, Moore
has identified another variant of retributivism that he describes as
“consequentialist retributivism.”118 Notably, Moore himself does
not endorse this rationale. According to Cahill, consequentialist
retributivism lacks avowed adherents, but it nevertheless “appears
to accord with the most natural, intuitive response to the problem
of how retributive justice would or should work in practice.”119
This variant treats retribution as a good, such that the role of
the justice system is to maximize the aggregate amount of deserved
punishment.
According to Moore, this approach remains
“distinctly retributivist” because it embraces “the view that the
guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic good.”120 This
good, therefore, “is not an instrumental good,” such that it views
deserved punishment as a means to achieve some other goal like
crime prevention. As presented by Moore, consequentialist
retributivism is entirely distinct from deontological retributivism.
Nevertheless one might attempt to integrate the two approaches by
deploying consequentialist retributivism as a mechanism for
setting priorities among competing punishment obligations.121
Either way, Moore does not elaborate on the working of this
approach in much detail, but he does provide some clues when he
explains how consequentialist retributivism resolves two problems
often leveled against deontological retributivism. First, it answers
the critique advanced by David Dolinko (unfounded, in Moore’s
view) that a deontological retributivist is unable to support actual
institutions of punishment which, by their nature, will sometimes
make mistakes and punish the innocent.122 A consequentialist

Cahill, supra note 11, at 836.
MOORE, supra note 22, at 157-58.
119 Cahill, supra note 11, at 861.
120 MOORE, supra note 22, at 157.
121 For instance, Noam Wiener arrives at a similar result as consequentialist
retributivism in arguing that “prosecutorial discretion ought to be applied from a
deontological perspective, which regards the gravity of the crimes perpetrated
and the responsibility of the perpetrator as the prime criteria for case selection.”
Wiener, supra note 55, at 89.
122
David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623
117
118
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retributivist, according to Moore, “need not maximize the
punishment of the guilty to the exclusion of other, equally valuable
states of affairs, such as the non-punishment of the innocent. Such
a retributivist may easily maximize both that those deserving
punishment receive it and that those not deserving of punishment
not receive it.”123 Second, the consequentialist is able to justify
decisions (which Moore sees as more problematic for deontologists
like himself) to “refuse to punish some guilty persons in order to
be able to punish other, more seriously guilty persons.”124 The
consequentialist retributivist can accommodate such decisions
because “no matter how good it is that the guilty receive their
deserts, more of that good is to be preferred to less of it.”125
The consequentialist retributivist, in sum, has two building
blocks at her disposal with which to accommodate the real-world
constraints that accompany actual institutions of criminal justice.
She may balance retributive goods against other intrinsic goods,
and she may set priorities to maximize retributive justice, even
when doing so involves an intentional refusal to punish someone
who is deserving. As is readily apparent, these building blocks
have significant purchase for institutional decision-making. They
allow us to make sense of strategies such as plea-bargaining, and of
decisions to grant witnesses immunity in exchange for testimony
against their co-conspirators.
They provide an agenda for
legislative priorities and prosecutorial discretion that favors the
prosecution of more serious offenses over less serious ones, and
that, all else being equal, privileges the disbursement of justice to
greater numbers of offenders rather than to fewer numbers.
Finally, they allow actors in the justice system to take cognizance of
(at least some) goods other than retributive justice.
Consequentialist retributivism also has substantial purchase as
a theory of ICL. I will sketch out this theory in three parts. First I
consider the implications of consequentialist retributivism for ICL
under the (admittedly artificial) assumption that retribution is the
only relevant good to be maximized. I argue that even under this
highly constrained assumption, consequentialist retributivism has
significant normative and explanatory power as a theory of

(1992).
123
124
125

MOORE, supra note 22, at 157.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
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substantive international criminal institutions.
Second, and
perhaps counter-intuitively, I argue that even this artificially
focused version of the theory fails to provide a conclusive
justification for the establishment of international criminal
tribunals or to resolve debates regarding the justifiability of
amnesties or other alternatives to conventional prosecutions.
Third, I consider how the model is both enhanced and complicated
by the embrace of other, non-retributive goods.
4.3.1. ICL and Maximizing Retribution
An initial problem in developing a retributive account of ICL is
that the normative theory of ICL addresses different questions than
those typically asked by retributive theorists. As a prima facie
matter, retributivism’s claim that desert justifies punishment does
not provide answers to the types of institutional and jurisdictional
questions central to ICL.
The consequentialist retributivist,
however, has recourse to an institutional theory dictating that
instruments of justice should be organized so as to maximize
retribution in the aggregate. Accordingly, the promulgation of
international criminal laws and the establishment of international
criminal tribunals are desirable when these measures will
maximize aggregate retribution in ways better achievable than
through other measures.
This basic proposition resonates with standard accounts of ICL
as a law focused on crimes that are extraordinarily grave and are
uniquely resistant to redress through conventional processes of
state punishment.126 At the level of substantive law, this view of
ICL reveals itself most clearly in the definition of crimes against
humanity, which has evolved to prohibit certain grave offenses
committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack against

126
For approaches to international criminal law or specific international
crimes that incorporate these elements in one form or another, see, e.g., LARRY
MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 63-79 (2004); WERLE, supra note 10, at 94 (noting
that crimes prosecuted by international tribunals reflect a “context of organized
violence”); Haque, supra note 8. Elsewhere, I have elaborated on an “enforcement
theory” of ICL according to which “ICL is concerned with offenses whose very
commission is associated with failures of domestic sovereignty, either because of
state inability to prosecute or because of illegitimate state reluctance to prosecute.
The very commission of an ICL offense, therefore, justifies heightened concerns
that the standard bases of domestic jurisdiction are inadequate and that additional
international bases of jurisdiction are appropriate.” Greenawalt, supra note 29, at
1096.
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any civilian population.”127 These are the types of mass atrocities
that are resistant to domestic enforcement because they are
typically committed either with the collusion of a state, or under
circumstances rendering the state unable to effectively bring the
perpetrators to justice. International prosecutions of genocide and
war crimes—the other “core” international offenses most
frequently prosecuted at the international level—also typically
involve contexts of systemic criminality.128
At the procedural level, one sees a similar concept in operation
in the admissibility requirements of the ICC, which impose both a
standalone gravity requirement for all prosecutable offenses, and a
complementarity requirement, mandating deference to domestic
courts when a state with jurisdiction is genuinely investigating or
prosecuting a particular case.129
The consequentialist retributivist can explain this aspect of ICL
in terms of a division of labor between domestic and international
courts. For many reasons, domestic courts are better suited to
prosecute most crimes. This is true as an economic matter, it is
true as a logistical matter, and, given the democratic deficit
inherent in international institutions,130 it is true as a matter of
comparative political legitimacy. In special cases, however, the
domestic court system will predictably prove inadequate, and ICL
can help bring retributive justice that is otherwise unachievable.
Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 7.
The definition of genocide does not explicitly require collective or
systematic criminality, but the crime’s focus on preventing the destruction of
entire groups necessarily associates the crime with collective criminality. See, e.g.,
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 440 (2007) (noting that a single person
“would rarely be capable of destroying an entire group, or even a significant part
of a group,” and querying whether “such an individual [should] still be found
guilty of genocide, even where his intended outcome was impossible to achieve”).
War crimes take place in the context of collective violence represented by a state
of armed conflict. Although they need not be systematic, the Rome Statute
reflects the international prosecutorial trend when it claims jurisdiction over war
crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a
large-scale commission of such crimes.” Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 8(1).
129 See Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 17. Although complementarity as
a formal legal requirement is unique to the statute of the ICC, the principle
remains relevant to other institutional contexts. For example, the UN Security
Council is unlikely to establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, as it did
with the ICTY and the ICTR, if it believes that a domestic court is equally up to
the task. In these contexts, the complementarity principle implicitly guides the
exercise of the Council’s political discretion.
130 See supra Part 3.
127
128
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ICL can have this effect in multiple ways. It establishes a
supra-national criminal prohibition that negates the legal effect of a
state’s efforts to exonerate the guilty. A crime’s international status
has the additional consequence of permitting prosecution by a
specialized international criminal tribunal, or by a domestic court
that, while lacking a traditional basis of criminal jurisdiction over
the offense, recognizes universal jurisdiction over a limited set of
international offenses.131
For the consequentialist retributivist, ICL’s focus on especially
grave offenses further reflects the limited capacity of international
courts to provide an effective substitute for domestic justice. Given
the extraordinary expense and effort involved in establishing and
maintaining specialized international tribunals, and the at-best
limited willingness of states to fund and support such efforts,
international prosecutions are rightly focused on only the most
egregious offenses whose prosecution will produce the largest
quantum of retributive justice.
Yet, even for these gravest offenses, the most successful
international tribunals have succeeded at prosecuting only a tiny
fraction of the guilty. Because the quantum of retribution achieved
matters to the consequentialist retributivist, this justification of ICL
is vulnerable to a critique about selectivity along the lines
advanced by Amann and Drumbl.132 Under this version of the
critique, the problem is not that retributivism is inherently
incompatible with selective punishment, but that the resources and
energy devoted to international prosecutions would be better
diverted to other retributive projects—such as the prosecution of
ordinary crimes in domestic courts. In this way, consequential
retributivist thinking can supply an argument against ICL.
On the other hand, as sketched by Moore, the consequentialist
retributivist is concerned not with the number of perpetrators
convicted per se, but with the aggregate amount of justice
dispensed: the model justifies letting lesser offenders go free in
order to secure the conviction of more serious offenders.133 The
conviction of a genocidal mastermind, therefore, should count
more than the conviction of an ordinary murderer. Such
131
See generally UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen Macedo ed.,
2004).
132 See supra Part 2.3.
133 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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comparisons are necessarily rough, but surely it is relevant, for
example, that the tiny country of Rwanda lost several times more
lives to murder during the few months of the state-orchestrated
1994 genocide than the United States has lost to murder during the
last several decades.134 A situation like Rwanda’s arguably justifies
the commitment of substantial resources to target a small, but
highly culpable fraction of the accused; for example, the senior
leadership.
The consequentialist retributivist model can also factor in the
potential of international tribunals to facilitate retributive justice at
the domestic level. For instance, international criminal trials may
serve as instruments of transitional justice, supporting an ongoing
political transition in a post-conflict society towards rule-of-law
values that will facilitate domestic prosecutions. Under the right
circumstances, an international trial might do so in a very concrete
manner by incapacitating culpable political leaders who pose a
threat to the transition.135 Consequentialist retributivism also has
the ability to incorporate expressive accounts according to which
international trials promote norm internalization both in specially
affected societies and on a global level.136 Although there are many
non-retributive benefits associated with a post-conflict state
undertaking a successful transition to a more stable society, and
with promoting global respect for the rule of law, these
achievements also contribute to the consequentialist retributivist
calculus to the extent that norm internalization facilitates domestic
efforts to achieve retributive justice.
4.3.2. The Challenge of Alternative Justice
Consequentialist retributivism, as I have described it, provides
a vocabulary for defending a system of ICL, one focused on the
prosecution of especially grave offenses that are resistant to
134 Estimates of the number killed in Rwanda in 1994 range from 800,000 to
one million. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that “[t]he number of
homicides reached an all-time high of 24,703 homicides in 1991 then fell rapidly to
15,522 homicides by 1999,” after which “the number of homicides remained
relatively constant.” Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, Homicide Trends in the United
States, 1980–2008, Annual Rates for 2009 and 2010, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.
135 For an argument along these lines in the context of the former Yugoslavia,
see Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Milosevic and the Justice of Peace, in THE MILOSEVIC
TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY (Timothy William Waters ed., 2013).
136 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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prosecution through the standard exercise of domestic jurisdiction.
Perhaps, counter-intuitively, it is also compatible with other
responses to mass atrocity, ones sometimes seen to conflict with
the ambitions of ICL.
I have already mentioned the example of Rwanda’s Gacaca
trials, which offered greatly reduced sentences—often no more
than community service—to those who confessed to participation
in the genocide.137 One can defend this arrangement on nonretributive grounds, for example by arguing that alternate justice
mechanisms such as these are better calibrated to promote
reconciliation and social stability in the wake of mass atrocities
than are conventional trials.138 But accounts of the Gacaca trials
commonly track consequentialist retributivist lines: although they
provided a diminished form of retribution, the Gacaca proceedings
nevertheless ensured a greater quantum of retributive justice for a
larger class of offenders than would otherwise have been possible
given the infeasibility of providing every suspect with a full and
fair trial in Rwanda’s beleaguered court system.139
In Rwanda, at least, these alternative proceedings took place in
parallel with more conventional prosecutions, reflecting a tiered
approach according to which the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the Rwandan courts prosecuted a select
group of high-level offenders, and the Gacaca trials processed a
See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
See Report on the Reflection Meetings Held in the Office of the President of the
Republic from May 1998 to March 1999, GOV’T RWANDA, 55-56 (1999),
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4907/2378.pdf?seque
nce=1 (summarizing discussions of Rwandan government commission and
reporting, inter alia, arguments in favor of Gacaca courts to address Rwanda’s
genocide on the grounds that: “The new Gacaca . . . would . . . give the power to
the people,” that “new justice can reestablish the unity of Rwandans based on
everybody’s participation,” that “[t]he new Gacaca will also help Rwandans to
believe and even actively participate in justice,” and that “[t]he people are not
considering Government justice as theirs”).
139
See, e.g., Shannon E. Powers, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for
International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice, 15 ASIL INSIGHTS 17 (June 23,
2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/ volume/15/issue/17/rwanda’sgacaca-courts-implications-international-criminal-law-and (“Retributive justice
emphasizes holding individuals accountable for their actions through
commensurate punishment. On the one hand, Gacaca has been credited with the
swift delivery of results that could not possibly have been achieved by the ICTR
or the national courts. This is significant because overcrowding in Rwandan
prisons had rendered conditions intolerable, and delayed trials also raise
significant human rights concerns. Tellingly, despite criticisms of the Gacaca,
virtually no feasible alternatives have been suggested.” (footnotes omitted)).
137
138
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larger group of mostly lower-level suspects.140 Consequentialist
retributive rationales are also available to even less traditional
approaches, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(“TRC”) by which South Africa offered individualized amnesties to
perpetrators of apartheid-era political crimes who offered full,
public confessions of their wrongdoing.141
In defending the TRC’s work from charges that it encouraged
impunity, the Commission’s chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu,
characterized the amnesty process in part in punitive terms:
The amnesty applicant has to admit responsibility for the
act for which amnesty is being sought, thus dealing with
the matter of impunity. Furthermore, apart from the most
exceptional circumstances, the application is dealt with in a
public hearing. The applicant must therefore make his
admissions in the full glare of publicity. Let us imagine
what this means. Often this is the first time that an
applicant’s family and community learn that an apparently
decent man was, for instance, a callous torturer or a
member of a ruthless death squad that assassinated many
opponents of the previous regime. There is, therefore, a
price to be paid. Public disclosure results in public
shaming, and sometimes a marriage may be a sad casualty
as well.142
Dan Markel has advanced a deontological understanding of
retributivism that he claims is satisfied by South Africa’s
individualized amnesty.143 According to this “confrontational”
retributivism, the state satisfies its moral duty “by ensuring a
connection ‘designed to bring home to the offender the nature of
140 For a summary of ICTR judgments, see American University Washington
College of Law War Crimes Research Office, ICTR Judgment Summaries,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/ictr_judgements.cfm. Rwandan law
provides that the most serious “category 1” offenders are subject to the most
severe penalties. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE COMPROMISED, supra note 114,
at 18. These cases were originally tried in the regular Rwandan court system. Id.
at 18-19. In 2008, the Rwanda Parliament passed a law transferring all but the
highest-level category 1 suspects to the Gacaca courts. Id. at 112-13.
141 See generally THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, VOL. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
TRC FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/.
142 Id. at 8-9.
143
Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards A Theory of Retributivism in
Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 398 (1999).
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his criminal act,’” and in which, so long as it acts impartially, “[t]he
state . . . can determine how that connection is made.”144
Markel defends the TRC process as a proportional response to
wrongdoing that, in recovering states like South Africa, can fully
satisfy a state’s retributive obligations.145 Consequentialist
retributivism, by contrast, permits a defense of individualized
amnesty as an insufficiently proportionate, compromised form of
justice that nevertheless represents a reasonable effort to maximize
retribution in imperfect conditions.146 South Africa’s experience
provides at least two building blocks for this argument, both
highlighted by Tutu. First, the prosecution of apartheid-era crimes
was only possible as the result of a negotiated settlement that
conditioned the political transition on an amnesty deal. According
to Tutu, “[t]here is no doubt that members of the security
establishment would have scuppered the negotiated settlement
had they thought they were going to run the gauntlet of trials for
their involvement in past violations for a political transition.”147
Id. at 432.
Id. at 434 (arguing that “proportionality must be understood, not strictly
with reference to the gravity of the crime instigating the encounter with the state,
but rather, to the confidence that the state has in knowing the perpetrator’s
recognition of his defeat, which implies the knowledge of the wrongfulness of his
unrestrained will”). Id. at 436-40 (arguing that the TRC’s amnesty procedures are
consistent with the author’s account of retribution).
146
Wiener argues that amnesties are impermissible because they treat people
as means to an end rather than as ends in and of themselves, thereby violating
Kant’s categorical imperative. See Weiner, supra note 55, at 178. This argument
indicates a possible limit to my suggestion that consequential retributivism can
also supply criteria for choosing among competing deontological obligations. See
supra note 121 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is not clear to me that this
conclusion about amnesties necessarily flows from Kantian deontology. Although
amnesties can serve social purposes, a decision simply to leave a suspect at liberty
does not affirmatively use someone in the way that society does, for example,
when it incarcerates a perpetrator in order to promote deterrence. Likewise, even
if de jure amnesties themselves violate moral duties, one might still distinguish
simple exercises of prosecutorial discretion, such as when an international
prosecutor declines to press charges against a suspect who has benefitted from a
domestic amnesty, from actions that affirmatively shield a suspect from
prosecution, such as when an international court declares a domestic amnesty to
be valid and legally binding.
147
TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, ¶ 22. Admittedly, this argument is
somewhat vulnerable to the critique that it appeals to the non-retributive value of
war avoidance, as South Africa could have endured a civil war without making
any commitment to amnesty. A consequentialist retributivist may counter,
however, that in that circumstance, the chance of achieving any retribution would
144
145
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Second, and as with Rwanda some years later, the “country simply
could not afford the resources in time, money and personnel”
involved in conventional prosecutions, and “the route of trials
would have stretched an already hard-pressed judicial system
beyond reasonable limits.”148 Whether or not one accepts the
factual predicates of these arguments in the particular case of
South Africa, these are precisely the types of arguments that would
lead a consequentialist retributivist, given the right set of
circumstances, to endorse particularized amnesty as the means best
suited to achieve the maximum retributive justice feasible.
Unlike the deontological model, moreover, consequentialist
retributivism supplies no definitive stopping point to this
reasoning. For example, even a general amnesty measure—one
that exempts a class of individuals from prosecution without
providing individualized hearings and determinations—could still
be said to provide a measure of retributive justice to the extent it is
accompanied by official statements condemning the wrongdoers as
a class, and perhaps also by factual findings that identify some
individual offenders. Measures like these may fail Markel’s
deontological account,149 but a consequentialist retributivist could
still defend this diluted justice as the best achievable under the
circumstances. Indeed, a consequential retributivist could endorse
complete impunity on the ground that resources and efforts are
best preserved for other offenders whose prosecution does not face
these obstacles.
4.3.3. Consequentialist Retributivism and Other Values
Thus far, my exploration of consequentialist retributivism has
focused on only one value, that of maximizing retributive justice.
Even within this narrow framework, I have argued that this
retributivism can justify a surprising variety of responses to serious
international offenses. It supplies a framework for understanding
have been far less certain.
148 TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 5.
149 See Markel, supra note 73, at 441 (arguing that the confrontational account
“affirmatively rules out any attempt to leave room for ‘political mercy’ in the form
of a blanket amnesty in recovering states, or otherwise”). Markel does allow,
however, that cases of supreme emergency can override retributive obligations.
Id. at 25 (noting “the challenges to retributive punishment in cases of supreme
emergency” and stating that “we need to consider more seriously how to identify
instances of emergency, such that even the confrontational conception of
retributive justice really should lose to threats to social peace”).
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and justifying ICL, but it also supplies a vocabulary for those who
argue, in particular cases, that conventional prosecutions should be
set aside for the more lenient treatment provided by various forms
of alternative justice, such as Rwanda’s Gacaca trials and South
Africa’s TRC.
Of course, the assumption that retributive justice is the only
operative value is an artificial one, as it ignores the other priorities,
such as funding health care and providing for a national defense,
that must compete with criminal justice for resources.
Consequentialist retributivism, according to Moore, can
acknowledge non-retributive values, and it “need not maximize
the punishment of the guilty to the exclusion of other, equally
valuable states of affairs.”150 Moore, however, devotes little
attention to identifying these states of affairs or explaining how
they interact with retributive values.
Perhaps the easiest case is when non-retributive goals
complement retributive goals. In establishing the TRC, argues
Tutu, South Africa did more than supply a measure of
punishment: “Had the miracle of the negotiated settlement not
occurred,” he argues, “we would have been overwhelmed by the
bloodbath that virtually everyone predicted as the inevitable
ending for South Africa.”151 The TRC also aspired to promote
future reconciliation through “restorative justice which is
concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting
imbalances, restoring broken relationships—with healing,
harmony and reconciliation.”152
If South Africa can avoid
bloodshed and promote future harmony with a particular
institutional response to wrongdoing, then it should choose that
response over other responses that do not promote these or
comparable goals, at least to the extent that no aggregate loss of
retributive justice is entailed. In some contexts, such as when the
U.N. Security Council invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to
establish an international criminal tribunal or refer a situation to
the ICC, the advancement of non-retributive goals is a de jure
requirement.153
MOORE, supra note 22, at 157.
TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 5.
152 TRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 141, at 9 (noting also that “amnesty cannot
be viewed as justice if we think of justice only as retributive and punitive in
nature”).
153 Ohlin, supra note 9, at 391 (arguing that certain consequentialist dynamics
150
151
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The more difficult question is how to resolve conflicts between
retributive justice and other values. Moore expressly contemplates
that consequentialist retributivism will sometimes favor nonretributive values over retributive values. He mentions, in
particular, the value of not prosecuting the innocent.154 Beyond
that, little is clear. One problem concerns the types of values that
belong in the calculus. The non-prosecution of the innocent, at
least, is a value particular to criminal justice, one that has a similar
moral and formal quality to the value of punishing the guilty. But
there is no obvious reason why the consequentialist retributivist
should not open the doors to any number of non-retributive goods,
such as the desire to prevent crime, avoid bloodshed, and promote
societal reconciliation. For a legislature that must set priorities and
allocate scarce resources, consideration of values such as these is
unavoidable.155
The second problem concerns the weight of competing values.
When Moore contemplates balancing deserved punishment
against, “other, equally valuable states of affairs,” the value he
mentions—that of protecting the innocent—is one generally ranked
higher than punishing the guilty.156 That is evident, for example, in
the fact that many legal systems require the establishment of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than applying, say, a “more
probable than not” standard.157 Once values such as peace-

are “central to international criminal justice, especially since both the creation of
the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as binding ICC referrals from the Security Council,
are based on the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority to take measures to
restore international peace and security. In this manner, then, criminal law
intersects with international law, insofar as the criminal justice system for
individuals is used as a way to help promote international peace and collective
security.”).
154 MOORE, supra note 22, at 157.
155
The international context also raises special problems regarding the
attachments that bind particular political communities. One can agree, for
example, that ICL is legitimated by the moral community of humanity as a whole,
while nevertheless accepting that political communities owe special obligations to
their own members that privilege the pursuit of local justice over global justice.
156 MOORE, supra note 22, at 157.
157
See, e.g., In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (“The requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for
cogent reasons. The accused, during a criminal prosecution, has at stake interest
of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized
by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom
of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when
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making, social reconciliation, and crime prevention come into the
picture as independent values that may be weighed alongside
retributive goals, consequentialist retributivism becomes
vulnerable to the critique that is not much of a retributivism at all,
as it provides decision-makers with a menu of non-retributive
values from which to draw, and does so without providing any
guidance for resolving conflicts between these values.
4.4. Threshold Retributivism
Moore himself endorses a different way of explaining why one
should “refuse to punish some guilty persons in order to be able to
punish other, more seriously guilty persons.”158 His “threshold
deontology” maintains that there are limits to the weight of
retributivist obligations, and thus that violations of agent-relative
moral duties are permissible when necessary to prevent
Moore elaborates that “[a]s the
“extraordinary harms.”159
consequences get more and more severe, the consequentialist
principle becomes of greater weight as applied to this situation,
until at some point (the threshold) the consequentialist principle
outweighs competing principles of morality.”160 Prior to reaching
the threshold, consequences determine the rightness of actions
only so long as no violations of moral duties are involved. After
the threshold is passed, however—an event that Moore analogizes
to water spilling over a dam161—the avoidance of negative
consequences can justify violating moral duties.
Moore’s best-known articulation of this concept involves
torture, which he argues may be justified against terrorists when
necessary to obtain “sufficiently good consequences,” and against
the innocent only to avoid “the most horrendous of
consequences.”162 However, he also applies this approach to
punishment, explaining that one should forego the punishment of

there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”). See also id. at 372 (“I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed
on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”) (Harlan, J. concurring).
158 MOORE, supra note 22, at 156.
159 Id. at 719.
160 Id. at 723.
161
Id. (“An analogy may help here: imagine water slowly rising behind a
dam until it eventually spills over.”).
162 Id. at 724.
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a less serious offender when necessary to “punish some very
deserving criminal(s).”163
How does this approach play out in the context of ICL? One
might argue that the high-stakes contexts of transitional justice
often accompanying international prosecutions dictate that all or
most of ICL lies beyond the threshold. If so, threshold deontology
does not provide a theory of how retributivism may be
operationalized at the international level so much as a theory of
why retributivism is irrelevant to ICL. After all, the future wellbeing of a society devastated by mass atrocities—and at risk,
perhaps, to be so devastated again—is a matter of such importance
that retributive values would seem to pale in comparison.
Accordingly, one could argue that decisions about whether and
how to pursue international criminal justice should be guided
entirely by utilitarian considerations.
The picture is not quite so straightforward, however. Although
Moore’s analogy to a dam overflowing seems to suggest a dramatic
divide between pre- and post-threshold thinking, the division
appears to apply on a decision-by-decision basis. To take Moore’s
example of society foregoing the prosecution of one offender in
order to secure the conviction of a much more culpable offender,164
threshold deontology in this instance operates only to justify the
particular choice between offenders. Absent other overriding
considerations, the example does not suggest that the actual
prosecution of the higher level offender should itself deviate from
retributive principles, for example when it comes to sentencing. So
too, at the international level, a threshold deontologist will
presumably continue to advocate as much retributive justice as is
feasible under circumstances that require some deviation from
retributive obligations.
If so, threshold deontology ends up at a similar place as
consequentialist retributivism, with retributive and non-retributive
considerations operating together, and it shares a similar
adaptability and indeterminacy.165 The primary distinction is that
in providing an exception to deontological obligations, it does
nothing to address the more general problem concerning which
Id. at 158.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
165
This will be particularly true if, as seems logical, consequentialist
retributivism is itself one of the principles that comes into play once the threshold
has been passed.
163
164
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types of decisions are bound by the duty to punish in the first
place. As such, it is not obvious that threshold deontology speaks
to as broad a range of institutional decisions—including whether to
establish international tribunals in the first instance—as does
consequentialist retributivism.
Moore’s threshold deontology has also drawn criticism for
imposing an arbitrary line of demarcation.166 If important nonretributive considerations can justifiably inform punishment
decisions, why must they wait until the threshold has passed?
Moreover, Moore may be wrong in his apparent assumption that
the threshold he identifies is met only in extraordinary situations.
As Douglas Husak has observed, “it is inevitable that the practice
of punishment will suffer from (at least) each of the following three
deficiencies: It will be tremendously expensive, subject to grave
error, and susceptible to enormous abuse.”167 Given that “the
drawbacks of punishment can be described as outweighing the
value of punishing the deserving,”168 the very establishment of a
criminal justice system arguably presents the kind of extraordinary
harm that, under Moore’s view, requires resort to non-retributive
justifications.169
5.

RETRIBUTIVISM AS A GOOD REASON TO PUNISH INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES

As I have just explored, different understandings of
retributivism converge upon certain common implications for the
implementation of criminal justice.
Retributivism imposes
important negative constraints on the administration of criminal
justice, and can guide the criminal law in other ways, but it cannot
provide a complete theory of punishment, as some accommodation
of other values is necessary for retributivism to survive in the real
world. The most that retributivism can do is supply a powerful,
non-exclusive, reason to punish, one that must be weighed
alongside other reasons favoring and disfavoring punishment.
These other reasons include the demands of liberal values (such as
166
Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893,
905-07 (2000) (arguing that threshold retributivism is arbitrary not merely because
it involves matters degree but, more problematically, because it involves the
weighing of incommensurables).
167 Husak, supra note 94, at 450.
168 Id. at 451-52.
169 Id.
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due process rights and other protections against convicting the
innocent), as well as utilitarian considerations such as crime
prevention, rehabilitation and incapacitation.
I will refer to this function of retributivism as “good reason
retributivism.”170 On this understanding, retributivism does not
supply an independently sufficient reason to punish, but it
supplies a stronger justification than either the purely negative
retributivism dictating that culpability is merely necessary to
punishment or the permissive version dictating that culpability
allows punishment.171 It is also distinct from the mixed theories of
punishment that erect a fixed division of labor between retributive
and non-retributive considerations, the best known of these being
H.L.A. Hart’s contention that utilitarianism should establish the
“general justifying aim” of punishment whereas retribution guides
the “distribution” of punishment.172 Nor, unlike Hart’s view, is
this type of retributivism vulnerable to the critique that it is, at
root, a utilitarian theory through and through because its putative
retributivism is in fact subservient to an overarching utilitarianism.
While good reason retributivism does not claim that
“[r]etributivism has no room for . . . other reasons,”173 and is thus
an entirely sufficient theory of punishment, it nevertheless offers
an understanding of retributivism that is internally independent of
other rationales. In other words, the conclusion that culpability
provides an intrinsically good reason to punish does not derive its
force from non-retributive considerations.
In describing good reason retributivism as a type of
retributivism, I do not attempt to carve out a unique justification
for punishment that is distinct from those I have surveyed. Rather,
my aim is to say something about how retributivism can function
as an applied principle of criminal justice, whatever its theoretical
underpinnings. For example, this understanding of retributivism
170
I borrow here from Leo Zaibert, who writes that “[r]etributivism is
always, in every context, at least a good reason for punishing.” ZAIBERT, supra
note 16, at 201-02.
171 See supra Part 2.1.
172
H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 9 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that “it is perfectly consistent to assert both that the
General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment is its beneficial
consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim should be qualified or
restricted out of deference to principles Distribution which require that
punishment should only be of an offender for an offence”).
173 See Moore, supra note 22, at 88-89.
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flows directly from the consequentialist retributivist view that
retributive goods must be balanced against other goods. It
likewise flows from a deontological position that acknowledges
limits to the scope and weight of retributive duties.
Good reason retributivism also leaves room for differing views
regarding the relative force of retributive considerations for
particular institutional decisions. Moore’s threshold deontology
contemplates that utilitarian factors will trump retributive duties
only in extraordinary cases.174 Husak, by contrast, attributes a
weaker force to these duties, arguing that the justification for
punishment always requires non-retributive reasons because, “At
most, the obligation of the state to punish is contingent on ‘other
things being equal’—which surely they are not.”175 Leo Zaibert
offers an intermediate formulation according to which “punishing
the deserving is prima facie the right thing to do,”176 but in which
this presumption favoring punishment is always subject to being
outweighed by the force of other values.177
A retributivism so defined unavoidably introduces
indeterminacy, some of which I have already explored.
Nevertheless, as I argue in this Part, the idea that desert supplies a
prima facie reason to punish is one that has powerful normative
force for ICL, and that, even if unacknowledged, resonates with
much contemporary thinking about the field. It provides a
framework for understanding the design of international criminal
justice institutions such as the ICC, and a basis for shoring up the
legitimacy of international justice efforts in the face of what are
often uncertain social consequences.

See supra notes 158–163 and accompanying text.
Husak, supra note 94, at 453.
176 ZAIBERT, supra note 16, at 215.
177 Zaibert defends this approach to retributivism based on the same types of
intuitive examples that Moore draws from. Just as intuition may tell us that
punishing the deserving is intrinsically good irrespective of whether it yields
additional good consequences, so may it lead a punisher—whether a parent
reprimanding a child or a judge convicting a criminal—to simultaneously weigh
both retributive and non-retributive considerations. While there is “no principled
way of ranking these different factors in a systematic, general way,” nevertheless
“[i]n some cases,” argues Zaibert, “some . . . factors will have preeminence and in
other cases other factors.” Id. at 214. Other criminal law scholars have also taken
a pluralistic approach to punishment theory, endorsing a retributivism that
operates alongside other punishment rationales. See Michael Cahill, Punishment
Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY (Mark D. White ed.,
2011).
174
175
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5.1. The Morality of Punishment
At its core, a retributive account gives voice to the moral
dimension of ICL, to the idea that horrific acts of mass violence
deserve punishment in ways that are not reducible to anticipated
social benefits. I have already indicated reasons why this impulse
cannot itself be sufficient to ground international criminal justice
institutions in a world of limited resources, limited capacity, and
competing values. But the mere insufficiency of this impulse does
not deprive it of normative force.
To illustrate the point, consider Andrew Woods’ use of the
famous trolley problem to support his skepticism of an ICL rooted
in the utility of desert.178 Faced with the scenario of an-out-control
trolley set to strike and kill five workers, respondents
overwhelmingly accept the permissibility of taking action to divert
the train to a different track where it will instead strike and kill just
one worker.179 But respondents overwhelmingly have the opposite
reaction to a variant of the scenario in which the only way to save
the five lives is to shove an extraordinarily heavy person off the
front of the trolley in order to brake the vehicle.180 Summarizing
research conducted by Joshua D. Greene, Woods notes that
“people tend toward consequentialism when emotions are not
involved, but when emotions run high (as when people imagine
themselves pushing someone to their death), they rely on a moral
heuristic (“Do no harm”).”181 Given the high emotions that
typically accompany international crimes, he concludes that “[t]he
risk that strong moral intuitions may guide decisionmakers to
outcomes that do not maximize utility may be particularly
pronounced at the international level.”182
That is one way to characterize the distinction between these
two scenarios. Another is to say that the reactions affirm a deeply
seeded, non-instrumental norm against killing for which the first
178
See Woods, supra note 7, at 667-68 (suggesting that people tend toward
consequentialism when emotions are “not involved”, but when “emotions run
high”, people rely on a “moral heuristic”). See also Judith Jarvis Thompson, The
Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1404-06 (1985) (describing the “trolley
problem”).
179 Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, 3 MORAL PSYCHOL. 35, 24
(2007); Thompson, supra note 178, at 1395.
180 Greene, supra note 179, at 24; Thompson, supra note 178, at 1409.
181 See Woods, supra note 7, at 667-68 (summarizing Greene, supra note 179).
182 Id.
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trolley scenario carves out a very limited exception for harmreducing actions that merely redirect a pre-existing threat not
created by the one who diverts the trolley.183 To be clear, Woods’
own purpose in invoking the trolley case is not to engage a broader
debate between utilitarianism and deontology, but instead to
critique the utility-of-desert justification for ICL by demonstrating
that the kinds of moral intuitions that undergird desert-based
thinking may not always produce the optimal social consequences
that the utility-of-desert theory itself seeks.184 More broadly,
however, Woods’ analysis raises the question of whether it is even
worthwhile to pursue an account of ICL (or of criminal law more
broadly) that relies exclusively on utilitarian reasoning without
affording retributive considerations a role. This question arises
directly for Woods because, although he expressly brackets actual
retributive theory as being outside the scope of his analysis,185 this
exclusion does not prevent him from exploring concrete policy
suggestions favoring non-punitive alternatives to international
criminal justice.186
If one accepts, as retributivists do, that there is intrinsic good to
punishing perpetrators of horrific offenses, and perhaps a moral
obligation to do so, then good reason retributivism can offer a
corrective to utilitarian theories by acknowledging a nonconsequentialist moral dimension to punishment. That this
consideration must coexist uneasily and indeterminately with nonretributive considerations necessarily limits its normative power,
183 This is Judith Jarvis Thompson’s explanation in her seminal article on the
trolley problem. See Thompson, supra note 178, at 112 (positing a “distributive
exemption” that is “very conservative” and “permits intervention into the world
to get an object that already threatens death to those many to instead threaten
death to these few, but only by acts that are not themselves gross impingements
on the few. That is, the intervener must not use means that infringe stringent
rights of the few in order to get his distributive intention carried out.”).
184
See Woods, supra note 7, at 669 (noting that “[t]he risk that strong moral
intuitions may guide decision-makers to outcomes that do not maximize utility
may be particularly pronounced at the international level . . . .”).
185
Id. at 634 n.2 (“I do not seek to spark a debate about the merits of
retributivism vis-à-vis consequentialism. Instead, I am concerned solely here with
evaluating the claim that the regime’s current retributive stance will produce
favorable consequences.”).
186
Id. at 674-81. Woods does caution that these suggestions “are not
included here as fully developed policy prescriptions, and in fact there may be
good normative reasons for not adopting some of them; that analysis is outside
the scope of this Article.” Id. at 674. One such “good normative reason” may be
that provided by the retributive theory.
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but this weakness is also counterbalanced by the fact that the
contemporary practice of ICL often operates under conditions of
significant uncertainty regarding contributions to social utility.
Accordingly, even a weak retributivism operating akin to a
rebuttable presumption can play an important tie-breaking role.
Take, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, established by the UN Security Council in 1993
as a measure to restore international peace and security.187 The
idea that the ICTY could promote peace by deterring crimes in the
conflict ongoing at the time is one that has justifiably attracted
skepticism,188 and indeed, many scholars reject deterrence as a
viable goal of ICL more generally.189 Hope that prosecutions
would promote ethnic reconciliation have yielded to skepticism, as
that goal has proven elusive and surveys indicate that many in the
Balkans take a dim view of the ICTY’s work and continue to deny
the atrocities that have been the focus of the Court’s work.
At the same time, the former Yugoslavia has avoided a return
to war during the major years of the Tribunal’s operation, and
several of its successor states have embarked on a moderating
course toward European integration.190 There is a case to be made
187 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. & Dec., U.N. Doc. S/INF/49, at
93 (1993) (acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish the ICTY). The
Council expresses in particular the belief that “the establishment of an
international tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for the abovementioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to
ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed.” Id.
188 See Damaška, supra note 1, at 339 (“In the adolescence of ad hoc tribunals,
the cardinal importance of general deterrence was frequently invoked. The
exaltation of this goal flowed from the hope that the mere threat of punishment
would produce a moderating effect on the brutalities of conflicts. But as the threat
failed to prevent horrendous atrocities, initial optimism surrounding this objective
failed.”). One might speculate, though, that the ICTY’s existence played a
deterrent role in Macedonia, which saw some hostilities in 2001 but arrived at a
peaceful resolution that avoided the catastrophic violence experiences in other
former Yugoslav republics. See Lauren Comiteau, Bosnia Twenty Years On – Part 2:
ICTY Failure to Deter?, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Apr. 10, 2012, 2:24 PM),
http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/bosnia-twenty-years-part-2icty-failure-deter (quoting former ICTY employee Refik Hodzic as saying, “I
believe the Tribunal has served as a deterrent in Macedonia, during the conflict
there in 2001 . . . .”). The 2001 hostilities produced one conviction at the ICTY. See
Prosecutor v. Boškovski & Tarulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (upholding conviction of Tarulovski
for war crimes and acquittal of Boškovski).
189 See supra note 18.
190 Croatia joined the European Union in July 2013. See Dan Bilefsky, Joyous
Croatia Joins Europe Amid a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A4. The incentive of
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that the ICTY aided this transition, for example by facilitating the
incapacitation (through both incarceration and self-imposed exile)
of extremist leaders during this period.191 It is also noteworthy that
the period of the ICTY’s trial of Slobodan Miloševic, when Serbia’s
former dictator scored high marks with the Serbian public for his
performance on the defense stand (an apparent sign of tribunal
inefficacy) also coincided with a period of increasing moderation in
Serbian politics that saw repeated electoral defeats for Miloševic’s
former party (a possible sign of tribunal efficacy).192
The truth, however, is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
reach precise conclusions about the ICTY’s efficacy. That is
because a punishment theory aimed at advancing broad societal
change does not easily lend itself to the kind of empirical
verification necessary to validate the theory. One simply cannot
say how things would look in former Yugoslavia today had the
ICTY never existed. Moreover, the tribunal’s apparent successes
benefitted from developments—including support from
international forces stationed in Bosnia and a popular revolution in
Serbia—that were outside the control of the ICTY and were not
foreseeable at the time the Security Council established the
Court.193
Other examples involve similar uncertainty. For instance, it is
today very uncertain whether the ICC’s arrest warrants against
Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Kony and Sudanese President Omar
al-Bashir will ever produce a trial and, if they do, what impact the
trials will have in Uganda and Sudan respectively.194 This
uncertainty is troublesome for utilitarian approaches to ICL which
possible EU membership is credited with facilitating a landmark power-sharing
agreement between Serbia and Kosovo concluded last April. See Dan Bilefsky,
Serbia and Kosovo Reach Agreement on Power Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2013, at
A9.
191
See generally Greenawalt, supra note 135; see also Luban, supra note 10, at
575 (“[I]ncapacitating toxic political leaders—a Goering, a Milosevic, a Charles
Taylor—can be absolutely crucial.”).
192
See generally Florian Bieber, The Show and the Trial: The Political Death of
Miloševic, in THE MILOŠEVIC TRIAL: AN AUTOPSY (Timothy William Waters ed.,
2013).
193 See generally Greenawalt, supra note 135.
194
See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Cases and Situations:
Darfur, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=darfur; Coalition for the International
Criminal
Court,
Cases
and
Situations:
Northern
Uganda,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=uganda (explaining the ICC investigations into the
situations in Darfur and Uganda).
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are concerned exclusively with the social consequences of
punishment. A good reason retributivist, by contrast, has an easier
time defending a broadly aspirational model of ICL because
uncertain social aspirations are supplemented by the intrinsic good
of punishing the guilty, a good which itself provides a prima facie
reason to proceed.
Indeed, under these circumstances, the
morality of punishing the guilty can provide an independent
source of legitimacy for international criminal tribunals, one that
arms courts with a shield—a partial one at least—against pressures
to produce demonstrable societal benefits in circumstances that are
often resistant to empirical verification.
4.2. Retributivism and the Structure of ICL
I have just explored ways in which good-reason retributivism
may provide a meaningful and normatively attractive rationale for
ICL. As a descriptive matter, this understanding of retributivism
also supplies a useful lens for understanding the existing discourse
and structure of ICL.
At a rudimentary, if not especially meaningful, level, one can
identify this understanding of retributivism in the commonly
invoked aspiration “to put an end to impunity,” which appears in
the statute of the ICC among other places195 and also in the
common identification of retribution as one among several goals.196
It also lends coherence to the fact that retributivist thinking
appears to dominate some institutional decisions more than others.
For instance, it helps explain what Jens Ohlin describes as the
“Rorschach test” quality of international justice according to which
policymakers establishing international tribunals rely heavily on
utilitarian thinking, but retributive considerations inform the
determination of individual sentences.197
One explanation of this disparity is that utilitarian impulses
aimed at satisfying victim demands for retribution guide the entire
enterprise. Another explanation, however, the one offered by good
195
196
197

Rome Statute, supra note 67, at pmbl.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Ohlin, supra note 9, at 392.

When one evaluates the practice of institutions, one considers the fate of
collectives and the consequentialist goals of peace and security take
centre focus, but when one evaluates the sentences of particular
individuals, then one focuses more tightly on retributive concerns: the
offender, his crime, and the moral gravity of the offence. Id.
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reason retributivism, is that retributive and non-retributive
considerations operate in tandem to address both types of
questions, with the relative force of these considerations
depending on the type of institutional decision in question. A
decision to establish an international criminal tribunal to address a
particular episode of mass atrocity is one that, by its nature, invites
significant non-retributive thinking because retributive theory is ill
equipped to determine the necessary resource allocations, and the
high-stakes contexts of societal transition that often accompany
international prosecutions focus particular attention on the
implications of trials for international peace and security.198 The
intrinsic good of deserved punishment remains a relevant factor,
but it does not provide an exclusive criterion for decision.
Sentencing, by contrast, is the type of decision for which
retributivism provides more concrete guidance, and for which
considerations of peace and security, by contrast, are less likely to
override individual punitive judgments. Perhaps this is because
these judgments involve a degree of specificity that does not
directly implicate peace and security, or as Ohlin argues, because
desert-based sentences best advance tribunals’ policy goals, thus
producing a correspondence between retributive and nonretributive aims.199
The idea that culpability provides a prima facie, but not
exclusive, reason to punishment also illuminates the particular
structure and context of the ICC, which is unique among
international criminal tribunals in that it is a permanent treaty—
based court with broad geographic reach. It is tempting to
conclude, as Woods does, that the ICC is emblematic of an
“international criminal regime [that] is largely limited to
backward-looking sanctions, the only form of accountability
compatible with retributivism.”200 This statement is true in the
sense that the ICC, like other tribunals, imposes punishment on
those suspects it convicts. Whether the international criminal
regime is “limited to backward-looking sanctions,” depends in
large part on how one defines the international criminal regime.
With the ICC thus far only targeting a handful of suspects for each

198
199
200

See supra Part 4.
Ohlin, supra note 9, at 390-91.
Woods, supra note 7, at 640.
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situation it has investigated201—and lacking the resources to do
much more—the fact remains that the overwhelming majority of
those responsible for mass atrocities will never face prosecution by
international criminal tribunals.
I have identified different reasons, some involving forwardlooking aspirations, why a state might in good faith wish or need
to limit its legal response to mass atrocity.202 A system of ICL that
insists on prosecuting only the most culpable high-level
perpetrators remains compatible, whether by happenstance or
design, with the view that states should be afforded substantial
discretion over how to balance forward and backward-looking
considerations in their handling of most perpetrators.
One important way in which the ICC does reflect a strong
commitment to punitive justice is the unprecedented discretion
that the Court’s statute gives to legal professionals over the
direction of the Court’s mission. Unlike ad hoc tribunals, which
emerge out of policy decisions by the UN Security Council or
individual state governments to focus prosecutions on particular
situations of mass atrocity, the ICC leaves it in many cases to
prosecutorial and judicial actors to determine when situations
involving alleged international crimes merit the Court’s attention.
So long as the crimes in question are committed on the territory of
or by a citizen of a state party to the ICC, the drafting history and
relevant treaty language reflect a determination that these
judgments focus primarily on formal, culpability-based criteria,
rather than the types of broad-based policy judgments one might
expect from a political actor like the Security Council.203
Accordingly, the Rome Statute reflects a strong presumption that
prosecution should follow the commission of international crimes,
even if those efforts are necessarily targeted against a select
handful of perpetrators.
This presumption in favor of prosecution, however, is not
absolute, as the Rome Statute leaves significant room for the
Court’s prosecutor and judges to consider non-retributive
rationales. For instance, the Prosecutor, subject to judicial review,
may determine that proceeding with an otherwise admissible case
201 Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20c
ases.aspx.
202 See supra Part 4.
203 See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 590-98.
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is not “in the interests of justice.”204
Also, the Court’s
complementarity framework requires the Court to defer to the
genuine investigations and prosecutions conducted by states with
jurisdiction over offenders otherwise sought by the Court.205
Attention has focused on whether these provisions may in some
circumstances require or permit deference to alternative justice
mechanisms such as South Africa’s individualized amnesty
process.206 Moreover, the UN Security Council retains authority to
defer ICC proceedings for one year at a time, when it deems it to be
in the interest of international peace and security to do so.207
Finally, at a less formal but nevertheless critical level, the ICC
remains a weak institution, dependent upon states both to supply
its limited funding and to apprehend and surrender fugitive
suspects to the Court. As such, the threat of non-cooperation
imposes a significant restraint on the Court’s authority to act on
retributive impulses that are not shared by the states whose
cooperation is essential.208 Non-cooperation, of course, is a blunt
tool, and in many cases—for example, when the non-cooperating
authorities are themselves behind the crimes in question—such
non-cooperation will elicit rightful condemnation, and the Court’s
Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 53.
Id. at art. 17.
206
See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis:
Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L. L.
107 (2009); Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 507 (1999); Carsten Stahn,
Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: Some Interpretive
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 695 (2005).
207 Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 16.
208
The ICC has faced particular resistance from many African states in its
efforts to arrest Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes. The African Union has repeatedly criticized
the arrest warrants, resolving that “AU Member States shall not cooperate . . . [in]
the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.” Assembly of
the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.391-415(XVIII), ¶ 3 (Jan. 30, 2012). A
number of African members of the ICC have received Bashir on state visits
without moving to arrest or extradite him. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7)
of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic of Chad to Comply with the
Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011); Prosecutor v. Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to
Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to
Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the
Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 12, 2011).
204
205

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE)

1032

10/13/2014 11:07 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:4

moral authority to demand retributive justice will survive
undiminished. However, non-cooperation can also provide an
important check on the Court’s ability to proceed in more difficult
cases, in which the Court’s efforts to secure justice find themselves
in tension with powerful non-retributive considerations. This risk,
combined with the general need to conserve resources, provides a
powerful incentive for the Court to focus its efforts on the cases
that are least likely to present compelling non-retributive
arguments for non-prosecution.
In sum, although the ICC is a court that dispenses retributive
justice, the question of how it contributes to a broader international
criminal regime is complex. Good reason retributivism provides a
rich way of framing this complexity. In important ways, the Rome
Statute endorses the view that culpability is a prima facie reason to
punish. At the same time, mechanisms and restraints both within
and outside the treaty make it possible to check that impulse when
overriding non-retributive considerations so dictate.
6.

THE LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT THEORY

I now briefly consider the practical implications of
retributivism in comparison to other approaches to ICL. Despite
significant theoretical differences among the various rationales for
punishment, I suspect that debates over punishment theory have
less practical significance for the field than might be supposed. On
the one hand, the current evolution of ICL reflects certain core
areas of agreement that are backed by persuasive arguments under
multiple approaches to punishment. In this way, the core of
international criminal law is overdetermined by punishment
theory. On the other hand, with respect to many of the most
difficult questions confronting international criminal law, the
dominant theories do not speak with sufficient specificity to
provide fixed answers. This indeterminacy has multiple causes. In
the case of retributivism, I have already argued that alternate
conceptions of retributivism can point in different directions and
that retributive theory alone does not supply a complete theory of
punishment. Instead, real-world implementation efforts require
retributive considerations to be balanced against non-retributive
considerations. This balancing is inherently indeterminate, and
can support a range of policy positions.
Utilitarian approaches, by contrast, do in theory provide a
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complete theory of punishment.209 As Cahill explains,
Utilitarianism, which bases punishment on the
forward-looking goal of preventing future crime, is not
only a justificatory theory explaining why criminal
punishment should exist, but also a prescriptive theory
explaining how punishment institutions should work.
The utilitarian agenda encompasses both the purposes
and the practices of the criminal justice system, seeking
in all cases and at all stages of the process to minimize
or prevent social harms (in the most cost-effective
way).210
As such, this agenda provides a criterion—crime prevention—for
the selection and ordering of various approaches to punishment—
such as deterrence, incapacitation, the utility of desert, the
realization of expressive values, and so forth. More broadly, it also
provides a criterion—utility maximization—to guide legislative
choices between criminal justice initiatives and other priorities.
Of course, the realization of this agenda requires agreement on
how to define and measure utility, as well as adequate information
regarding the likely consequences of social policy choices. In a
world of evaluative disagreement and imperfect information, it is
far more challenging in practice to identify the demands of
utilitarianism on many issues, including the contested questions of
international criminal law that I consider here.211
A comprehensive consideration of how the competing
punishment rationales might inform international criminal justice
is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I will focus on few key
policy questions, and suggest some general reasons for skepticism
that punishment theory will play a decisive role in their resolution.
6.1. Crimes
Contemporary ICL focuses principally on offenses of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes that are both
extraordinarily grave, and typically take place in the context of
209
See Cahill, supra note 11, at 817 (“In a meaningful way, utilitarianism
provides a complete theory of criminal justice, while retributivism apparently
does not.”).
210 Id. at 818.
211
See, e.g., Damaška, supra note 1, at 343-42 (“[N]o metric is available to
establish a rigid set of priorities for the goals of adjudication: they are simply too
disparate to be ranked against a common measure.”).
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organized violence that is resistant to enforcement at the national
level.212 A consensus that these core crimes should be a focus of
ICL is unlikely to hinge on one’s general philosophy of
punishment. The basic building blocks of this consensus lie in a
comparative assessment of domestic and international institutions.
Given the functional and political considerations that make the
criminal law (whatever its underlying goals) almost exclusively the
province of domestic institutions, the role of ICL is predictably
concerned with systematic atrocities for which domestic
institutions are less reliable.213 The focus on crimes of special
gravity, moreover, flows both from a retributive emphasis of
individual culpability and with a utilitarian concern for preventing
great societal harms. As a prima facie matter, these are the types of
crimes retributivists will most want to punish, and that utilitarians
(whether relying on deterrence, incapacitation, expressive norm
projection, the utility of desert, or some other rationale) will most
wish to prevent.
At the same time, this basic account of ICL fails to provide clear
guidance on current debates regarding the outer limits of ICL. One
question concerns the reach of existing international offenses, all of
which have seen significant historical evolution. For instance, an
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber considering Kenya’s post-election violence
found itself split over the breadth of crimes against humanity,
whose elements under the Rome Statute require that these crimes
involve participation in a “widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population” where the attack “is
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack.”214 A two-judge majority affirmed the Court’s
jurisdiction and eventually confirmed charges against four
suspects, reasoning in relevant part that the acts of non-state
violence alleged exhibited sufficient organization to meet the
statutory definition.215 A dissenting judge argued, by contrast, that
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra Part 4.
214 Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 7.
215
See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in Kenya, ¶ 90 (Mar. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf
(Majority
Opinion)
(“Whereas some have argued that only State-like organizations may qualify, the
Chamber opines that the formal nature of a group and the level of its organization
should not be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have convincingly put
212
213
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in cases of non-state crimes, the “organizational policy”
requirement should be construed to involve the policies of a statelike entity.216 The difference between these positions, not yet
resolved by the ICC’s Appeals Chamber, has enormous
implications for the reach of international criminal law into
situations of non-state violence committed outside the context of
armed conflict.
Related questions concern the recognition of new international
offenses. Recent attention has focused on whether terrorism
should be prosecuted as an international crime,217 and debate has
also focused on the proposed inclusion of drug smuggling, slavery,
The crime of
apartheid, human trafficking, and piracy.218
aggression, prosecuted after World War II, but since abandoned by
successor tribunals, has reignited controversy arising out of efforts
to amend the Rome Statute to include the crime.219 One might also
observe that even “ordinary” crimes such as domestic violence are
often resistant to effective prosecution at the domestic level.
Resolving these questions requires sorting through a host of

forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to
perform acts which infringe on basic human values.”).
216
See id. ¶ 90 (Kaul, J., dissenting) (interpreting Rome Statute requirement
that crimes against humanity are “pursuant to state or organizational policy” to
require involvement of an “entity which may act like a State or has quasi-State
abilities”).
217
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy,
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (U.N.
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://www.stltsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/main/filings/orders-and-decisions/appealschamber/f0936.
218 STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 22 (3d ed. 2009). Despite states’ exercise of universal jurisdiction over the
crime of piracy, Antonio Cassese argues that piracy does not implicate a
“community value,” and thus does not rise to the level of a true international
crime. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2008).
219
In June 2010, the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties approved amending
the Rome Statute to extend the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
The Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, I.C.C. Doc. RC/Res.6 (June 11,
2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6ENG.pdf. The amendment will not take effect unless it is ratified by at least 30
parties, and receives the approval of at least two thirds of the Assembly of States
Parties at the meeting to be held after January 1, 2017. See id.; Rome Statute, supra
note 67, at art. 121(3). On the controversies surrounding the crime, see generally
Sean D. Murphy, The Crime of Aggression, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF
FORCE (2013).
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issues concerning the limits of international law and international
institutions that are not reducible to one’s preferred criminal
theory, although different punishment justifications will suggest
different limiting factors. A contractarian retributivist might
highlight the fragile political legitimacy of international
whereas
utilitarians
and
consequentialist
institutions,220
retributivists might argue that international courts should direct
their limited resources to only the most serious crimes involving
the greatest social harms and the greatest moral culpability.
Theorists of all stripes must worry that an overly expansive
international criminal law will prove self-defeating by meeting
strong resistance from states and eroding the perceived legitimacy
of international institutions.
These pragmatic considerations are especially significant for
rationales that might otherwise favor a more expansive ICL.221 For
instance, one might identify great expressive value in expanding
ICL to embrace ordinary offenses—such as domestic violence—
that receive insufficient enforcement in many countries.222
However, the fragility and weakness of international tribunals
dealing with mass atrocity crimes argues in favor of relying on
other institutions, such as human rights courts, to address states’
obligations respecting the broader set of offenses that invoke
international concern.
6.2. Design and Alternatives to Prosecution
I have explored how various understandings of retributive
theory can embrace alternatives to international prosecution, such
as the precedent set by South Africa’s Truth Reconciliation
Commission.223 A utilitarian unconcerned about the intrinsic
moral worth of retribution will likewise have little trouble
accepting that societal interests can justify non-punitive or quasiSee supra Part 3.
See, e.g., David Luban, Response to Crimes Against Humanity: Beyond
Moral Minimalism, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 353, 356 (2006) (“On pragmatic grounds I
agree that ICL should limit itself to serious crimes. Its institutions lack the
capacity to prosecute even major atrocities, let alone a more ambitious docket.
That is not a principled objection, however.”).
222
On the other hand, one might endorse the expressive value of
highlighting only the absolute gravest offenses such as genocide and crimes
against humanity. In this way, the demands of an expressive account depend
very much on that which one wishes to express.
223 See supra Part 4.
220
221
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punitive responses to mass atrocity. But the fact that multiple
approaches to punishment converge on the theoretical desirability
of alternative mechanisms does little to resolve the problems
inherent in assessing the justifiability of particular alternatives in
concrete situations.
A central complexity is that arguments favoring alternative
processes tend to be context specific. It may well be that South
Africa’s response to apartheid was the best available option under
the circumstances, but that response will not provide a one-sizefits-all solution for other situations involving very different
historical and political contexts. Moreover, judgments about what
type of response, if any, should be pursued in particular
circumstances necessarily rely on imperfect information and are
resistant to empirical verification.224
As a result, the underlying dilemmas of transitional justice
present difficult questions of institutional design for an
international system whose existence manifests a determination to
limit state discretion over punishment matters. The establishment
of the ICC reflected, in part, a dissatisfaction with the discretionary
and politicized system of ad hoc tribunals, in which the underlying
balancing is entrusted to the political actors who determine
whether or not to establish a tribunal for a particular situation.225
But there are also complexities to having international
prosecutorial and judicial officers decide these questions without
the benefit of meaningful legal criteria or the kind of democratic
accountability to affected societies that might otherwise justify the
delegation of policymaking to legal officials. Accordingly, debate
persists over how the ICC should approach arguments for
deference to non-traditional proceedings.226
See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 590-98 (summarizing the drafting debates
and their resolution in the ICC).
226
For some suggested proposals for how the ICC should approach such
questions, see, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 187-91 (proposing that alternative
justice mechanisms be evaluated for (1) good faith; (2) democratic legitimacy; (3)
the characteristics of the violence the procedures seek to address, as well as the
current political climate; (4) the avoidance of gratuitous or iterated punishment;
(5) the effect of the procedures on the universal substance; and (6) the preclusion
of the infliction of great evils on others); Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with
Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanisms,
23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 261-65 (2008) (arguing that alternative justice mechanisms
merit deference by the ICC when they are necessary, legitimate, and advance
international justice to the same degree that the exercise of ICC jurisdiction
224
225
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The debate over alternative justice also raises tensions between
the local and global ambitions of international criminal justice. For
instance, a deterrence theorist might express concern that
embracing an alternative justice mechanism, whatever the benefits
to the local community, will dilute the ability of ICL to deter future
crime in other regions. But this concern carries little weight if one
believes that the deterrent effect of international justice is too weak
to carry weight in the first instance, or that deterrence is more
likely to work in a more specific, situation-by-situation manner.
Likewise, an expressivist might be concerned that foregoing
prosecution in one context inhibits the law’s ability to send a global
message about the wrongfulness of international crimes. Yet this
argument begs the question of whether traditional prosecution is
the only way to send this message, and whether that is the only
message to send.
In raising these questions, I am not arguing that punishment
theory is irrelevant to the problems of alternative justice.
However, addressing these issues requires more specific
arguments than can be provided merely by endorsing a general
approach to punishment.
6.3. Case Selection
International criminal trials are characterized by extreme
selectivity. Restrained by limited resources and limited
enforcement ability, they have prosecuted only a small handful of
participants in mass atrocities that often involve many thousands
of perpetrators. The burden of undertaking more extensive trials is
left to national authorities, who may or may not do so. A complete
theory of international criminal law must come to terms with this
selectivity and provide guidance to decision makers.
International practice has converged on the idea that
international criminal tribunals should give priority to prosecuting
the highest level perpetrators who bear the greatest criminal
responsibility.227 This intuitive policy is readily defensible under
multiple approaches to punishment.
To the extent that
retributivism can, in fact, guide questions of case selection—as for
would); Stahn, supra note 206. I have argued that the very delegation of these
questions to the ICC raises problems of institutional legitimacy. See generally
Greenawalt, supra note 7.
227 See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 627-29 (surveying the historical practice of
international criminal tribunals in focusing on high-level offenders).
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example under the consequentialist retributivist model I have
outlined—then it will favor targeting more blameworthy offenders
over less blameworthy ones.228 For those focused on the utility of
desert, the unique symbolic importance of leadership figures
dictates that their prosecution will generally be a public priority,
such that failure to prosecute those perceived to be the most
responsible will be more detrimental than a failure to punish lower
level perpetrators. Leadership figures are also a natural target for
deterrence theorists: they are generally better situated to prevent
crimes than are individual, low-level actors, and their smaller
numbers make it more predictable that they will be targeted.
Where there is a risk of continuing or future atrocities,
incapacitation may be a plausible ambition for certain individual
high level figures who are in a unique position to cause great
harm. The generally greater culpability and unique symbolic
status of high-level figures is also likely to imbue their
prosecutions with greater expressive value.
But this general consensus only solves so much. There may be
situations, for example, where a leadership figure’s relatively low
degree of criminal responsibility creates a tension between
pursuing the highest level perpetrators and the most responsible
perpetrators. In cases where crimes are committed by multiple
sides to a conflict, there is value to prosecuting at least some
offenders from all sides, even if the handful of worst offenders is
clustered on one side of the conflict.229 Sometimes, also, there may
be unique expressive value to highlighting certain types of
offenses—for example, in order to call public attention to the
prevalence of sexual crimes in war—even if, under the
circumstance, doing so requires the prosecution of some lowerlevel offenders. In all these cases, moreover, there may be doubt
about how precisely to weigh the gravity of a particular offender’s
criminal contribution.
A similar set of problems concern which general situations
should be selected for prosecution in the first instance. In the case
of ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, the political actors who set up the
tribunals have already selected the situations. At the ICC,
however, the Court’s prosecutor is largely responsible for

228
229

50.

See supra Part 4.3.1.
I have argued this point elsewhere. See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 647–

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

02_GREENAWALT (DO NOT DELETE)

1040

10/13/2014 11:07 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:4

determining where the Court will focus its investigations.230 As a
general matter one can agree that the Court should focus on the
situations of the highest gravity, but there may be reasons to
deviate from purely gravity-based criteria, perhaps because, for
any number of reasons, the Court’s intervention is more likely to
benefit one society more than another, because the Prosecutor
wishes to call attention to a particular type of crime, or because one
situation offers a higher probability of apprehending suspects than
does another.
All of these examples raise the possibility of a conflict between
desert-based considerations and other considerations and so would
appear to create a wedge between many retributivists and
utilitarians. However, the differences are not as straightforward as
they might first appear. A consequentialist retributivist, for
example, could justify an expressive project to highlight sex crimes
at the international level on the grounds that doing so might lead
national legal systems to take these offenses more seriously, even
if, as I have hypothesized, doing so requires a focus on lower level
offenders. Alternately, if prosecuting perpetrators on all sides of a
conflict promotes the perceived legitimacy of a tribunal, a
retributivist can endorse this approach on the ground that it will
promote the rule of law in affected societies and thereby facilitate
national prosecutions of additional offenders.
On the other hand, utilitarian approaches that deviate too
much from retributive principles risk backfiring. One advantage of
desert-based decision-making is that it upholds a conventional
picture of prosecutors as legal actors who act based on neutral
criteria. A prosecutor who relies excessively on non-retributive
considerations risks being perceived as an overtly political actor,
thereby undermining the perceived legitimacy of international
proceedings. Moreover, it is far from clear that prosecutors are
well positioned to predict the impact of their discretionary choices.
To take just one example, the ICC’s very first trial focused
exclusively on war crimes charges related to the recruitment and
use of child soldiers.231 The expressive ambition apparent in the

230
So long as she is dealing with crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, the
Prosecutor has the authority to refer situations to the Court involving crimes
committed on the territory of or by a citizen of any state party to the Rome
Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 67, at art. 12.
231 Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case
No.
ICC-01/04-01/06
(Mar.
14,
2012),
available
at
www.icc-
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decision to shine a spotlight on these particular offenses found
itself threatened by criticism that the prosecution had ignored the
accused Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s apparent culpability for more
serious crimes involving rape, murder, and torture.232 Cases such
as these certainly do not invalidate the relevance of expressive and
other non-retributive considerations, but they do suggest that
exercises of prosecutorial discretion that depart too far from
retributive thinking risk being self-defeating.
6.4. Sentencing
My final example focuses on sentencing policy. International
tribunal statutes have afforded relatively little attention to
sentencing policy, and have left the determination of punishments
primarily to the discretion of judges. There are powerful reasons
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.
232
See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 2, at 273 (“[S]ome argue that the
prosecutor was wrong to charge the Court’s first defendant, Thomas Lubanga,
only with recruiting child soldiers when there was evidence that he was also
responsible for crimes of sexual violence and other serious war crimes.”); Marlise
Simons, Congolese Rebel Convicted of Using Child Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012,
at A12 (noting that the judgment against Lubanga “underscores some of the
failings and limits of the prosecution’s approach. The rebels under Mr. Lubanga’s
command were known to have pillaged, raped and killed many civilians in
enemy villages, but prosecutors said when he was handed to The Hague in 2006
that the best evidence they had was about child recruiting”); William Schabas,
Lubanga
Sentenced
to
Fourteen
Years
(July
13,
2012),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2012/07/lubanga-sentence-tofourteen-years.html (“There is a widespread view circulating by which the
Lubanga trial did not deal with the real issue, which is sexual assault.”). That
prosecutors may have limited the charges principally for lack of sufficient
evidence at the time the charges were brought does not alter the expressive
ambitions manifest in the decision to choose this particular defendant for the
ICC’s first trial. Marlise Simons, Congolese Rebel Convicted of Using Child Soldiers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A12. Notably, Lubanga was already in custody in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) on charges of genocide, crimes against
humanity, murder, illegal detention, and torture at the time that the ICC issued its
arrest warrant, a fact suggesting that the Court should have deferred to the
domestic proceedings under the Rome Statute’s Article 17 complementarity
provision.
See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision
Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision 10 February 2006 and the
Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas
Lubanga
Dyilo,
¶
33
(Feb.
24,
2006),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc236260.pdf. Although the Pre-Trial Chamber determined
that the DRC was willing and able to prosecute the accused, it nevertheless found
the case admissible on the ground that the DRC proceedings involved different
crimes than the ones before the ICC. Id. ¶¶ 34-33. Hence, the ICC proceedings
had the effect of precluding Lubanga’s prosecution on more serious charges.
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dictating that the most culpable offenders should be sentenced to
substantial periods of incarceration commensurate with their
desert. This policy comports with the retributive principles and
also with rationales that emphasize the utility of desert. Robert
Sloane has likewise argued that the expressive goals of
international criminal law are best served by a proportional
sentencing scheme.233 As Jens Ohlin has observed, moreover,
rehabilitative rationales that sometimes favor lower sentences in
the domestic context extend less easily to high-level ICL offenders
who have committed especially grave offenses and are not likely to
reform.234
Nevertheless, a general commitment to desert-based
punishment only goes so far. As I have already explored, it
supports a practice of ordinal proportionality—punishing more
blameworthy offenders to longer sentences than less blameworthy
offenders—but fails to resolve questions of cardinal
proportionality that concern the general harshness of punishments
across the scale.235 Moreover, the seemingly less controversial
matter of ordinal proportionality raises unique complications for
international criminal law. First, the implementation of ordinal
proportionality requires agreement regarding the relevant
population of offenders. A practice of proportionality that
compares ICL offenses only to other ICL offenses will likely
produce a broader range of sentences—and thus greater leniency at
the lower end—than one that compares ICL offenses to ordinary
domestic crimes.236
Of course, making comparisons between offenses can itself
involve great complexity. The frequently collective nature of ICL
offenses can make it difficult to evaluate the relative contributions
of individuals to the larger crime. Debate has focused on whether
there is a hierarchy of international offenses, and on how to define
and rank the various modes of participation that criminal

233
See Sloane, supra note 3, at 81-85. See also Ohlin, supra note 9, at 386-87
(arguing that if “the whole point of [ICL] sentences is to express society’s
condemnation of such horrendous activity[,] . . . then clearly we want to express
that genocide and crimes against humanity are far greater crimes than single cases
of murder.”).
234 See Ohlin, supra note 9, at 386-87.
235 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
236 See id.
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culpability assumes.237 There is also the question of which
additional mitigating or aggravating factors should inform
culpability assessments. Notably, the context of organized mass
violence—the very aggravating feature that defines ICL offenses—
also arguably mitigates the culpability of some otherwise law
abiding participants whose criminal guilt is in large part the result
of an altered normative universe established by collectively
This
sanctioned—sometimes
state-ordered—violence.238
relationship between the individual and the collective presents a
defining challenge for ICL sentencing. Thus far, international
sentencing has proceeded on an ad hoc basis without the benefit of
formalized sentencing guidelines or shared understandings
regarding how to compare international and domestic offenses.
7.

CONCLUSION

A reader of international criminal scholarship might be
forgiven for thinking that it’s not possible to be a retributivist
about international criminal law. Some ICL specialists have
dismissed retributive approaches as uniquely incompatible with
the specific context of international crime. Others have ignored
their contribution entirely, or referenced them only in passing.
This Article responds to the anti-retributivist strain by
providing a qualified defense of a retributivist ICL. In mounting
this defense, I have not attempted to resolve longstanding debates
over the general justification of punishment, or to argue for
retributivism’s general superiority over utilitarian rationales.
Instead, I have sought to show how someone committed to

See Danner, supra note 9; supra note 92 and accompanying text.
RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 50 (2000) (noting “the diminished sense
of blameworthiness and related criminal responsibility associated with periods of
nondemocratic rule”); Luban, supra note 10 (noting that “[t]he kinds of mass
violence that ICL addresses take place within what participants regard as
struggles to the death between groups, in which killing and humiliating the
enemy likewise seems like a supremely meaningful form of violence”); W.
Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human
Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (Autumn 1996).
237
238

In many of the most hideous international crimes, many of the
individuals who are directly responsible operate within a cultural
universe that inverts our morality and elevates their actions to the
highest form of group, tribe, or national defense . . . . [T]he perpetrators
may not have had the moral choice that is central to our notion of
criminal responsibility. Id.
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retributivist precepts can indeed make sense out of ICL, and do so
in a way that takes complex account of ICL’s distinguishing
characteristics.
My account is qualified because it acknowledges that
retributivism cannot provide a complete theory of ICL, but must
instead co-exist with non-retributive rationales. This qualification,
however, does not derive from any special feature of the
international context. Instead it reflects the general limitations of
retributivism as a real-world institutional theory.
I have also highlighted the flexibility of retributive thinking,
the ways in which it can support a broader range of policy
outcomes—both affirming and rejecting international criminal
prosecutions—than might be expected. And I have indicated that
many debates about international justice policy are unlikely to be
resolved by the embrace of retributive principles.
One might object that these qualifications emphasize the
irrelevance of retributivism, and thus prove the point I have tried
in this Article to resist. But the concessions necessary to make
retributivism plausible also allow one to appreciate the theory’s
comparative strengths: (1) Retributivism provides a compelling
argument against punishing the innocent and punishing in excess
of desert, and (2) it gives voice to the intuition that there is a moral
case for punishing the worst atrocities that is not reducible to
expected societal benefits.
Accounts will differ as to how much weight the latter,
affirmative argument is owed in high-stakes contexts that often
accompany ICL offenses. But even a tie-breaking role will be
significant given the difficulties inherent in predicting the impact
of criminal trials on complex historical events. And I suspect that
this retributive impulse plays a greater role among supporters of
international criminal institutions than is reflected by the common
impulse to emphasize the benefits of prosecution. If I am correct in
this suspicion, then perhaps this Article’s principal contribution is
to identify and explain the retributivist strain that already
underlies much thinking about international criminal law.
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